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The Voting Rights Act of 1965 revolutionized access to the voting
booth. Rather than respondingto claims of voter suppression through
litigation against individual states or localities, the Voting Rights Act
introduced a coverage formula that preemptively regulated a large
number of localitiesacross the country. In doing so, the Voting Rights
Act replaced reactive, piecemeal litigation with a proactive structure
of continualfederal oversight. As the most successful civil rights law
in the nation's history, the Voting Rights Act provides a blueprintfor
responding to one of the most pressing civil rights problems the
countryfaces today: police misconduct. As with voter suppression in
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the mid-twentieth century, abusive police conduct against minority
citizens is a nationalproblem perpetratedby thousands of localities.
Federal efforts to cure the problem through litigation against
individual police departments have failed to produce widespread
reform. This Article applies the lessons of the Voting Rights Act by
proposing the use of a coverageformula to identify and regulate local
police departments engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional
misconduct. While such a law would significantly enhance federal
power over police departments, such a change is both necessary to
curb police misconduct and constitutionallypermissible.
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INTRODUCTION

Selma, Alabama, and Ferguson, Missouri, will forever be known for
government violence against Black Americans. In Selma, in March of 1965, state
troopers beat peaceful marchers who sought the ability to vote.' Five decades
later, in Ferguson, in August of 2014, a police officer shot and killed an unarmed
Black teenager, Michael Brown, who was stopped in the street by the officer on
2
suspicion he had stolen cigarillos from a convenience store. Both incidents
generated national attention because they reflected ingrained national problems.
In the 1960s, countless localities across the South replicated the voting
3
discrimination in Selma, persisting despite decades of federal remedial efforts.
Similarly, the Ferguson Police Department is not an outlier in using deadly force
6
5
against Black Americans: Philando Castile,4 Alton Sterling, Samuel DuBose,

1.

See infra Part H.C (describing the historical circumstances surrounding the violence in

Selma).
2. See, e.g., Julie Bosman & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, GriefandProtestsFollow Shooting ofa
Teenager, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/us/police-say-mikebrown-was-killed-after-struggle-for-gun.html [https://perma.cc/S85M-6V7J] (providing details on the

Michael Brown shooting).
3. See infra Part II.B (detailing a series of laws passed by Congress to deter voter suppressions
through piecemeal, reactive litigation).
4. Matt Furber & Richard P6rez-Pefia, President Calls Police Shootings 'American Issue,'
N.Y. TIMEs, July 8, 2016, at Al (describing police shooting of Philando Castile in Falcon Heights,
Minnesota, during a traffic stop).
5. Richard Fausset et al., U.S. Examines Police Killing in Louisiana,N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 2016, at Al (describing police shooting of Alton Sterling in Baton Rouge, Louisiana).
CIN.
6. Sharon Coolidge et al., Prosecutor: UC Officer 'Purposefully Killed' DuBose,
3 830 777
ENQUIRER (July 30, 2015), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2015/07/29/publish/ 0
[https://perma.cc/8GN8-WQZE] (describing shooting of Samuel Dubose by University of Cincinnati
police officer during a traffic stop).
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Tamir Rice,' Eric Garner,8 Walter Scott, 9 Laquan McDonald,"o and at least 655
other Black individuals are among those killed by police since the death of
Michael Brown."
For voting rights, the violence at the Selma march was a tipping point. It
led to the enactment of the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (hereinafter
VRA).1 2 That law proved to be the most successful civil rights statute in the
country's history, radically altering the federal response to voter
discrimination. 13 Replacing earlier statutes that provided for litigation in
response to individual instances of racial discrimination, the VRA created a
coverage formula to identify offending states and localities and it subjected them
to preemptive and ongoing federal oversight. 14 Unusual in its breadth and
contentious at its time, the VRA eradicated discriminatory devices and
techniques and gave millions of Black Americans access to the polls. 15 Indeed,
the VRA was so successful in changing the voting landscape today that the
Supreme Court recently deemed the illness of voting discrimination cured. 16
Ferguson is this generation's Selma; police misconduct, our civil rights
problem. Michael Brown's death sparked protests and riots around the country.17
Today, across the political spectrum is deep and widespread concern about

7. Allen G. Breed, Police Killing DataFilled with Many Unknowns, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec.
7,
2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/07/police-killingsn_6284358.htmfl
[https://perma.cc/BU5T-QEXP] (describing the police shooting of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice in
Cleveland).
8. Martin Kaste, System for Reporting Police Killings Unreliable, Study Finds, NPR (Mar. 6,
2015),
http://www.npr.org/2015/03/06/391269342/system-for-reporting-police-killings-unreliablestudy-finds [https://perma.cc/LWR7-X6DY] (reporting on police shooting of Eric Garner in New York).
9. Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Chargedwith Murder of
Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/south-carolinaofficer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-deaththtml [https://perma.cc/LJ9D-UQTG] (describing
the shooting death of Walter Scott by a North Charleston police officer, caught on a cell phone camera).
10. Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Justice Officials to Investigate ChicagoPolice Department
After
Laquan
McDonald
Case,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
6,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/1 2 /07/us/justice-dept-expected-to-investigate-chicago-police-afterlaquan-mcdonald-case.html [https://perma.cc/5XVK-RU8K] (describing the shooting of Laquan
McDonald by a Chicago police officer).
11. The Fatal Encounters website aggregates and fact checks news reports of civilian deaths at
the hands of law enforcement. This figure only reflects documented deaths of African American
individuals at the hands ofpolice between August 10, 2014, and September 30, 2016. It does not include
the 777 cases where Fatal Encounters was unable to determine the race of the victim. Thus, this figure
is
possibly
underinclusive.
See
Spreadsheets,
FATAL
ENCOUNTERS,
http://www.fatalencounters.org/spreadsheets [https://perma.cc/693U-5W7X].
12. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat 437 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 and 52 U.S.C.).
13. See infra Parts II.D & E (describing the key provisions of the VRA and the impact it had on
Black voter registration and turnout).
14. See infra Part II.D (discussing key provisions of the VRA).
15. See infra Part II.E (discussing the impact of the VRA on problematic jurisdictions).
16. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (invalidating the coverage formula of the
VRA).
17. See, e.g., Bosman & Fitzsimmons, supra note 2.
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abusive police practices and their impact upon racial minorities.18 Indeed, in
2016 Terrence M. Cunningham, President of the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, which is the largest police organization in the United States,
apologized for his profession's "mistreatment of communities of color."l 9 With
little hope of local police departments (or their governing municipal bodies)
reforming themselves, there is a growing consensus that only new forms of
federal intervention will produce the necessary reform.20 So far, however,
Congress has created only limited federal tools for remedying police violations
of civil rights. 21 The Department of Justice (DOJ) can pursue lawsuits in federal
courts against police departments and officers, but such suits must be filed
individually against single departments and their personnel. Relief is only
available if the DOJ is able to prevail in its particular claims or reach a favorable
settlement. Likewise, individuals who are victims of police misconduct can bring
civil lawsuits in federal court for damages. But those suits-which can be
expensive to pursue in the first place-can only generate a remedy against an
individual department or officer. Reaching other police departments requires
additional lawsuits, and even succeeding against a particular department (or
officers) on a given claim does not guarantee that that department (and officers)
will refrain from engaging in other kinds of abusive practices in the future.

18. See Eric L. Adams, We Must Stop Police Abuse ofBlack Men, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,2014, at
35 (addressing ways to prevent police abuse that is targeted at communities of color); see also Emily
Badger, We've Reached a Tipping Point when Charles Krauthammer Is More Outspoken on Police
Abuses than Barack Obama, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2014 (addressing police bias and excessive force)
("When partisans who haven't said much about these issues before start to speak up, too, that's a sign
that a larger swathe of America may be waking up to that reality, too."); Susan Saulny, ChicagoPolice
Abuse CasesExceedAverage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,2007, at 24 (findings from new report show patterns
of police abuse were worst in low-income minority neighborhoods); Mitch Smith & Matt Apuzzo, U.S.
Makes Deal with Clevelandon PoliceAbuses, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2015, at 1 (reporting that the Justice
Department opened nearly two dozen investigations into police departments and found patterns of
unconstitutional policing); Ilya Somin, Reducing Police Abuses by Reducing the Number of Hostile
InteractionsBetween Police and Civilians, WASH. POST, July 10, 2016 (addressing the problem of
police brutality and excessive force use against African Americans and the socioeconomic factors that
heighten these encounters).
19. Tom Jackman, US. Police Chiefs Group Apologizes for 'HistoricalMistreatment' of
17, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/trueMinorities, WASH. POST (Oct.
crime/wp/2016/10/17/head-of-u-s-police-chiefs-apologizes-for-historic-mistreatment-of-minorities
[https://perma.cc/9W7N-LA8X].
20. See, e.g., Blake Fleetwood, Congress Finally Acts to Prevent Police Killings, but Will It
Make a Difference?, WASH. MONTHLY (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ten[https://perma.cc/PT9L-PSSR]
miles-square/2014/12/congressfinally_-acts to preve053348.php
(describing Republican Senator Rand Paul's support for the federal Death in Custody Reporting Act);
Jon Swaine, Eric Holder Calls Failure to Collect Reliable Data on Police Killings Unacceptable,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/15/eric-holder-no-reliablefbi-data-police-related-killings [https:// http://penna.cc/Q7VJ-KD46] (reporting on a statement by thenAttorney General Eric Holder that the inability even to track police use of force "strikes manyincluding me-as unacceptable").
21. See infra Part I (detailing the gradual growth of these limited regulations of local police
conduct).
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The limited tools available today to combat police misconduct bear a
striking resemblance to those the federal government used to combat voting
discrimination prior to the enactment of the VRA. Lawsuits had been limited to
individual towns or counties with respect to particular voting practices and relief
depended upon prevailing at trial or through settlement. While the DOJ can and
does pursue litigation today against individual police officers and departments,
the piecemeal approach that the law requires has proven insufficient to produce
widespread reform.22 Just as prior to the VRA, when lawsuits against local
election officials had been a mechanism too little and too late to protect the right
to vote, suing police officers and their departments in response to excessive
violence and other abuses leaves today's law enforcement inadequately
accountable and civil rights under protected. 23
Remedying local police misconduct will require a federal law modeled
upon the core provisions of the VRA. The law would set forth a coverage formula
to identify police departments engaged in civil rights violations, and it would
impose targeted reforms upon those departments in order to prevent future
violations.
From the perspective of states and localities that historically exercised near
plenary control over elections, the VRA was an intrusive federal statute. A law
modeled upon the VRA to reduce police misconduct would likewise represent a
significant increase in the power of the federal government over state and local
affairs. However, given the magnitude of police misconduct and the failures of
past responses to it, aggressive federal intervention is consistent with
constitutional principles of federalism.
Part I describes the failures of past and current efforts to combat local police
misconduct and the resulting persistence of civil rights abuses. Part II discusses
the history of the VRA, its provisions, and its impact on voting discrimination to
establish instructive precedent for remedying modem police abuses. Part III sets
out the details of a federal law modeled upon the VRA to remedy police
misconduct. It describes how Congress could develop a coverage formula to
identify police departments engaged in unlawful conduct by consideration of
criteria such as the number of civilians killed by a municipality's police
department; the frequency of civil rights lawsuits against departments; unusual
trends in arrest, stop, and search data; and shortfalls in officer disciplinary
measures. Part III also identifies the reforms to which covered departments could
be subject, including new rules goveming use of force, the adoption of early
intervention systems (computerized databases that allow supervisors to catch
problematic pattems of behavior by individual officers), improved complaint
management procedures, body cameras and other technological tools, and
22. See infra Part II.D (chronicling the passage of 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which gives the United
States Attorney General the authority to initiate structural reform litigation against police departments
engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct).
23. See infra Part I (demonstrating this problem across multiple regulatory avenues).
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ongoing oversight measures. Part IV considers the constitutional issues raised by
a federal law modeled upon the VRA to respond to police misconduct and why,
notwithstanding federalism concerns, such a law is likely to survive judicial
review.

I.
FAILED RESPONSES TO POLICE MISCONDUCT

Police misconduct, which frequently entails a constitutional violation, is a
major civil rights problem. The problem remains unsolved despite decades of
effort to produce reform. 24 In 1931, President Herbert Hoover's National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement issued its "Report on
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement," which described widespread physical abuse
of suspects during custodial interrogations.25 While that report generated some
reforms, abusive conduct on the part of police remains entrenched today. Federal
taskforces have found a range of problems that commonly afflict police
departments, including racial profiling; excessive uses of force; unlawful stops,
arrests, and searches; dishonesty under oath; and the planting of evidence. 26 Such
tactics implicate a series of constitutional protections including the Fourth
Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth
Amendment's right against self-incrimination and to due process, the Sixth
Amendment's safeguards at trial, and the Fourteenth Amendment's requirements
of due process and equal protection of the laws. Decades of academic study have
likewise concluded that misconduct that entails constitutional violations plagues
police agencies across the country. 27
Police misconduct disproportionately affects members of racial minority
groups. Blacks and Latinos in particular are more likely "to live in high-crime
neighborhoods where policing may be contentious" and "to report having
negative interactions with police." 28 In jurisdictions across the country, racial
minorities are subject to a disproportionate number of unlawful traffic stops, 29
24. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENF'T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE
(1967),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/42.pdf
CRIME
IN
A
FREE
SOCIETY
OF
[https://perma.cc/K5Z4-3DFS].
25. NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENF'T, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT 3 (1931).
26. Michael S. Scott, Progressin American Policing?Reviewing the NationalReviews, 34 L.
& Soc. INQUIRY 171, 172 (2009) (reporting on six national commissiqns that have catalogued police
misconduct).
27. Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the "New Paradigm" of Police
Accountability: A DemocraticApproach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REv. 373, 380-81 (2010)
(citing examples of police misconduct identified in the academic literature).
28. Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race and Perceptions ofPolice Misconduct, 51 Soc.
PROBS. 305, 305 (2004).
29. For a general review of the national scope of racial profiling in traffic stops, see David A.
Harris, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on Our Nation's Highways, ACLU (June 1999),
https://www.aclu.org/report/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways
[https://permacc/MPW6-Z5Q9]; Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew Lehren, The DisproportionateRisks of
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Terry stops, 30 and officer use of deadly force. 31 As a result, the proportion of
Black and Latino residents in a geographical area correlates with the frequency
of civil rights complaints for police brutality filed in that geographical area.32
Besides the equal protection issues that are implicated, unequal treatment
of certain members of the population has real consequences. A vast literature
demonstrates that the legitimacy and effectiveness of policing depend heavily on
perceptions by ordinary citizens that officers are following fair procedures in
their interactions with the public and can be trusted. 33 Legitimacy fosters citizen

Driving While Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racial-

disparity-traffic-stops-driving-black.html [https://perma.cc/8QGB-8VW5] (describing evidence of bias
in traffic stops in Greensboro, North Carolina). Data also shows that Black individuals are
overrepresented in traffic stops. See, e.g., Christopher Ingraham, You Really Can Get Pulled overfor
Driving While Black, Federal Statistics Show, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/09/you-really-can-get-pulled-over-fordriving-while-black-federal-statistics-show [https://perma.cc/EC85-YK3B] (showing that more Black
drivers were pulled over than White drivers, according to the limited Justice Department statistics). In
self-reported surveys, Black and Latino drivers are also more likely to believe that they were pulled over
unjustifiably by law enforcement. See Richard J. Lundman & Robert F. Kaufman, Driving While Black:
Effects of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender on Citizen Self-Reports of Traffic Stops and Police Actions, 41
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 195 (2003) (describing the results of a study which confirmed that "police are
significantly more likely to stop African-American male drivers").
30.
The New York Police Department (NYPD) is an iconic example of this phenomenon. On
August 12, 2013, U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin ruled that the NYPD's stop-and-frisk program
violated the constitutional rights of minority residents, as it constituted a "policy of indirect racial
profiling." Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York's Stop-and-FriskPolicy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-rights-judge2013),
rules.html [http://perma.cc/BS4W-86C8] (providing details about Judge Scheindlin's ruling). In 1990,
the NYPD officers only recorded 41,438 Terry stops. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME
SAFE: NEW YORK'S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 128 (2012). By 2011, this number

had risen to an astonishing 685,724-an increase of over 1,500 percent. Dylan Matthews, Here's What
You Need to Know About Stop and Frisk-and Why the Courts Shut It Down, WASH. POST (Aug. 13,
2013), http://www.washingtonpostcom/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013
/08/13/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-stop-and-frisk-and-why-the-courts-shut-it-down
[https://penna.cc/2VYT-B4A7]. Of those stopped by the NYPD pursuant to this policy, an estimated 87
percent were either Latino or African American. ZIMRING, supra note 30, at 129. And these stops rarely
led to an arrest or yielded illegal contraband. On average, the NYPD seizes illegal contraband once for
every 143 stops of African Americans and 99 stops for Latinos. Adam Serwer & Jaeah Lee, Charts:Are
the NYPD's Stop-and-Frisks Violating the Constitution?, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 29, 2013),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/04/new-york-nypd-stop-frisk-lawsuit-trial-charts
[https://perma.cc/74WF-WD3F].
3 1. The
Counted: People
Killed by
Police in
the US,
GUARDIAN,
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-usdatabase [https://perma.cc/5EXT-Z8NZ] (showing that 7.18 per million Blacks and 3.5 per million
Latinos were killed by police in 2015, compared to only 2.92 whites).
32. See, e.g., Malcolm D. Holmes, Minority Threatand PoliceBrutality: Determinantsof Civil
Rights Criminal Complaints in US. Municipalities, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 343 (2000) (using data on 18
U.S.C. § 242 complaints to identify patterns of complaint frequency in demographically varied
municipalities).
33.

See generally, CHARLES R. EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: How POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE

&

AND CITIZENSHIP (2014); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); Jason Sunshine
Tom R. Tyler, The Role ofProceduralJustice in ShapingPublic Supportfor Policing, 37 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 513 (2003).
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cooperation with law enforcement, thus making the job of officers easier. 34 If,
by contrast, the public perceives the police to be acting unfairly, the police lose
legitimacy, citizen disobedience increases, and cooperation from the community
in preventing and solving crimes diminishes. 35 In large municipalities like New
York City, Blacks and Latinos report lower levels of trust in law enforcement as
a result of police treatment of minority residents; subsequently, Blacks and
Latinos are less willing to cooperate with the police. 36 When distrust undermines
the effectiveness of police work, it implicates broader public concerns.
Specifically, its impact extends beyond any particular individual or group subject
to mistreatment and, through unsolved crimes and other deficiencies, imposes
costs upon society as a whole.
Nonetheless, police misconduct does not implicate all localities equally. A
DOJ study concluded that certain police departments have generated
significantly more federal complaints for misconduct than other similarly sized
police departments.3 7 One reason for such disparities is the structure of a police
department itself. Experts in policing report that "the roots of police misconduct
rest within the organizational culture of policing."3 8 In particular, "lax
supervision and inadequate investigation" of internal wrongdoing make some
departments considerably more likely to produce misconduct than others. 39
Given the considerable decentralization of American policing, wide disparities
can thus exist from one municipality to the next.40

34. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, The Legitimacy ofPoliceAmong YoungAfrican-American Men,
92 MARQ. L. REV. 651 (2009); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and
Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 375 (2006).
35. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq et al., Why Does the Public Cooperatewith Law Enforcement?: The
Influence ofthe Purposes and Targets ofPolicing, 17 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 419 (2011).
36. Tom R. Tyler, Policing in Black and White: Ethnic Group Diferences in Trust and
Confidence in the Police, 8 POLICE Q. 322, 332-40 (2005) (showing this disparity in Tables 1 through
4).
37. See FederalResponse to Police Misconduct:Hearing Before the H Subcomm. on Civil and
Const. Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 92-162 (1992) (showing New Orleans and
Los Angeles County as the top locations for misconduct).
38. Simmons, supra note 27, at 381; see also ALLYSON COLLINS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 33, 45 (1998)

(describing the ways organizational structures contribute to police misconduct); INDEP. COMM'N ON
THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT (1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT] (linking the LAPD's

organizational mismanagement to misconduct); Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and
Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 493-94 (2004) (explaining how organizational culture
can facilitate police brutality).
39. Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on
Accountabilipy, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 818 (1999).
40. Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 141-48
(2016) (describing decentralization in American law enforcement and its effects).
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Police departments have proven unwilling or unable to take adequate steps
to prevent or remedy officer misconduct. 41 Police departments tend to protect
their own and have little incentive to watch for or respond to abusive practices. 42
Even in cases of egregious police behavior that generates widespread publicity,
43
a department's response may be to close ranks rather than to recognize fault.
State and local officials have also failed to curb police misconduct. This, too, is
not surprising. Preventing and remedying police misconduct is costly and
requires localities to reallocate scarce resources from schools, parks, and other
services to deal with police reform." Government officials depend upon
favorable relationships with their police departments and elections may turn on
the level of police support. 45
A.

Approaches to Preventingand Remedying Police Misconduct

When violations of rights persist at the local level, the federal government
can intervene. The DOJ has pursued some instances of police misconduct, but
those efforts have not resulted in comprehensive reform. 46 The basic
shortcoming is that the remedial tools Congress has created can, at best, address

"

41. See id. at 148-50 (showing how municipalities have had little incentive to address police
misconduct that disproportionately affects minority residents and discussing the example of the
Maricopa County Sheriffs Department).
42. Armacost, supra note 38, at 454 (explaining how "[i]n the face of outside criticism, cops
tend to circle the wagons, adopting a 'code of silence,' protecting each other, and defending each other's
actions. If the misconduct is found to be true, moreover, their departments deem the miscreants 'rogue
cops' whose conduct does not reflect negatively on the organization from which they came").
43. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jesse Bidgood, Prosecutors Say Baltimore Police
MishandledFreddie Gray Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/07/29/us/freddie-gray-baltimore.html [https://perma.cc/AR4N-RZJS] ("After a string of highprofile defeats, the prosecutors who were unable to win convictions of police officers in the death of
Freddie Gray ... sharply accused the city's Police Department of undermining them."). Some authors
have described a "blue wall of silence" or an "unwritten code in many departments which prohibits
disclosing perjury or other misconduct by fellow officers, or even testifying truthfully if the facts would
implicate the conduct of a fellow officer." Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall ofSilence
as Evidence ofBias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. Prrr. L. REv. 233, 237
(1998).
44. Stephen Rushin, StructuralReform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN.
L. REv. 1343, 1408-09 (2015) (reporting on resource constraints).
45. For example, the nonpartisan research organization MapLight has shown that lobbying
groups associated with police unions have spent over a million dollars in recent years to influence
http://maplightorg/us-congress/lobbying?client-Police
MAPLIGHT,
See
elections.
[https://perna.cc/7W8K-8H2F]; see also Lee Fang, Baltimore Activists Recount How Police Unions
Crushed Accountability Reforms, INTERCEPT: UNOFFICIAL SOURCES (May 1, 2015),
https://theintercept.com/2015/05/01/police-union-influence-maryland-runs-deep
[https://penna.cc.J4FE-3E2M];Lee Fang, Maryland Cop Lobbyists Helped Block Reforms Just Last
Month, INTERCEPT: UNOFFICIAL SOURCES (Apr. 28, 2015), https://theinterceptcom/2015/04/28/
balltimore-freddie-gray-prosecute [https://perma.cc/D53T-8URD].
46. Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, supra note 44, at
1353 ("Historically, the federal government has never acted as 'the front line troops in combating ...
police abuse."') (quoting John R. Dunne, Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice
in Police Brutality: Hearing Before the H Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 133 (1991)).
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only specific problems in individual departments through a piecemeal approach.
There is, in other words, no current mechanism for the DOJ or any other entity
to target multiple departments in a single remedial action, nor is there any
mechanism to ensure the sustainability of federal police reform efforts.
In addressing police abuses, the DOJ has made use primarily of two
statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 242, which authorizes the DOJ to bring criminal charges
against police officers who willfully deprive individuals of their constitutional
rights, 47 and 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which empowers the DOJ to pursue equitable
relief against police departments engaged in a pattern or practice of
unconstitutional conduct.48 In principle, these two statutes give the DOJ
considerable power to curb police abuses. However, they have proven to be of
limited effectiveness, since resource limitations have prevented the DOJ from
deploying either statute in more than a small number of cases. 49
In addition, because of a lack of recordkeeping on local police behavior,
the DOJ has struggled to identify which police officers and which police
departments are actually in violation of the statutory provisions. 0 Further, state
and local governments have tended to resist federal intrusion, which has blunted
the effectiveness of the DOJ's statutory powers.
This is not the first time the DOJ has lacked adequate tools to remedy local
violations of the constitutional rights of minority citizens. Before the enactment
of the VRA, the DOJ was likewise limited to addressing violations of voting
rights through piecemeal tools that failed to produce more systemic reform. It
should, therefore, come as little surprise that a similar piecemeal approach to
remedying police misconduct is not effective.
Other efforts beyond DOJ interventions to address police misconduct have
also failed to alter the overall landscape. The federal courts have invalidated
certain police practices. However, as courts are limited to specific cases, they too

47.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) ("Whoever, under color of any law ... willfully subjects any person
in any State . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States . .. shall be fined under this title or imprisoned. . . .").
48.
42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) ("Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe
that [a police department is engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct], the Attorney
General, for or in the name of the United States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and
declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.").
49. Brandon Garrett, Remedying RacialProfiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 41, 100-01
(2001) (reporting that the DOJ lacks the resources to address policing problems like racial profiling, as
indicated by the small number of consent decrees under § 14141); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing
Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1407-11 (2000) (linking lack of DOJ enforcement of § 14141 cases to resource
constraints); Stephen Rushin, FederalEnforcement ofPoliceReform, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 3189,3192,
3226 (2014) (discussing reasons for the small number of § 14141 cases); Kami Chavis Simmons, The
Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law
Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 493 (2008) (stating that the DOJ has cited
cost effectiveness as a reason for avoiding litigation in § 14141 cases).
50. Rushin, FederalEnforcement of PoliceReform, supra note 49, at 3240 (outlining problems
of case selection).
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have not served as the engine of more generalized reform. Efforts by victims to
sue errant officers or their departments have likewise produced only limited
success.
The remainder of Part I examines efforts to prevent and remedy police
misconduct by addressing the successes and shortcomings of four approaches:
the exclusion of evidence at trial, civil lawsuits, criminal prosecution of
individual officers, and structural reform litigation. As Part I shows, while each
of these tools has been useful in certain circumstances, none has produced
general reform. The result, as was true with respect to voting prior to the VRA,
is ongoing misconduct directed largely at minority citizens that evades a cure.
1.

Exclusion ofEvidence

The exclusionary rule aims to deter police misconduct by barring admission
at trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution. The Supreme Court
first adopted the rule in 1914 in Weeks v. United States, ruling unanimously that
the government could not use evidence obtained unlawfully by a federal law
enforcement agent against a defendant at trial.51 The Court explained, "[t]he
tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions . . . should
find no sanction in the judgments of the courts." 52 Weeks and its progeny were
limited to federal law enforcement, a relatively small subsection of police
officers, but in 1961 the Court extended the exclusionary rule to state law
enforcement agents in Mapp v. Ohio.53
While empirical evidence suggests that federal and state courts make
regular use of the exclusionary rule to bar unlawfully obtained evidence, 54 the
rule has added only limited value in actually curbing police misconduct. Since
Weeks and Mapp, the Supreme Court has carved out numerous exceptions to the
exclusionary rule.5 5 As a result, the rule today is substantially narrower than the
scope of misconduct that exists in American police departments.
For example, a wide range of police wrongdoing may violate the
Constitution but not result in the collection of incriminating evidence, such that
the exclusionary rule is of no practical relevance.5 6 In addition, the deterrent

51. 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
52. Id. at 392.
53. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
54. See David Alan Sklansky, Is the ExclusionaryRule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567,
580 (2008) (reporting that 300,000 cases each year are thrown out because of Fourth Amendment
violations).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20 (1984) (permitting prosecutors to use
evidence obtained unlawfully if officers nonetheless acted in good faith); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431
(1984) (holding that police are allowed to use evidence obtained unlawfully if evidence would have
been inevitably discovered).
56. For example, in August of 2013 a federal district court found that the NYPD's use of stopand-frisk violated the constitutional rights of minority residents because it constituted a "policy of

2017]

FROMSELMA TO FERGUSON

275

value of the rule is reduced when most criminal convictions result not from trials
but from guilty pleas in which defendants waive any challenges to constitutional
violations by police investigators.5 1
Scholars and policymakers have criticized the exclusionary rule for, among
58
other things, allowing "manifestly dangerous criminals" to go free on what
might seem like a technicality and failing to serve the interests of those who are
innocent. 59
Perhaps, most significantly, the future of the exclusionary rule may be in
doubt. In recent cases, members of the Supreme Court have expressed
60
considerable skepticism about the continued usefulness of the rule. So far, that
skepticism has translated into gradual narrowing of the circumstances in which
exclusion of evidence is required. 61 Yet some commentators have predicted that
62
in the future the Court may significantly limit or dispense with the rule entirely.
As a result, the exclusionary rule has done little to reform police misconduct in
the past and is not likely to play a significant role in reform in the future.
2.

Civil Litigation

Private litigants have sought redress for police misconduct through civil
litigation, but this avenue also has significant limitations. Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, litigants can bring suit in federal court against police officers who
deprive them of federal constitutional rights.63 Such suits, however, are difficult
to win.64
A series of problems also stand in the way of using § 1983 to remedy police
misconduct in a systemic fashion. Individual officers are protected from civil suit

indirect racial profiling." Goldstein, supra note 30. Notably, in 90 percent of these cases no arrest or
summons resulted and thus the exclusionary rule was irrelevant. Id.
57. Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 801, 831-33 (2003).
58. Guido Calabresi, The ExclusionaryRule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 111 (2003).
59. Akhil Reed Amar, Against Exclusion (Except to Protect Truth or Prevent Privacy
Violations), 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457,465 (1997).
60. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006) (expressing skepticism about the
continuing need for the exclusionary rule because of improved professionalization of law enforcement).
61. See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (applying the attenuation doctrine to hold
exclusion of evidence was not warranted where a police officer unlawfully stopped a pedestrian and
demanded to see his identification, ran a background check that produced an outstanding warrant,
arrested the individual on the basis of that warrant, and in the search incident to the arrest discovered
narcotics and drug paraphernalia possession of which the defendant was prosecuted and convicted).
See generally Chris Blair, Hudson v. Michigan: The Supreme Court Knocks and Announces
62.
the Demise of the Exclusionary Rule, 42 TULSA L. REv. 751 (2007); James J. Tomkovicz, Hudson v.
Michigan and the Future ofFourthAmendment Exclusion, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1819 (2008).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
63.
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding . . . .").
64. See, e.g., Project, Suing the Police in FederalCourt, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 783 (1979) (showing
that juries "are not impartial because many jurors disfavor plaintiffs and favor police defendants").
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by the qualified immunity doctrine,65 which shields them from liability when
they are acting within the scope of their employment and their behavior does not
demonstrate a clear disregard for constitutional rights. 66 Officers whose conduct
leaves them beyond the safe harbor of qualified immunity generally still benefit
from departmental indemnification policies. Virtually all departments indemnify
police officers for penalties resulting from a successful § 1983 action. 67 As a
result, officers rarely if ever personally feel the financial consequences of their
own misconduct. The deterrent value of § 1983 is thus modest for individual
officers.
Alternatively, a plaintiff can use § 1983 to reach into the deeper pockets of
the relevant municipality. Since Monell v. NYC Department of Social Services,
private litigants, have had the ability to bring suit against municipalities that, in
their hiring, training, or supervision of police officers, were deliberately
indifferent to the constitutional rights of individuals.68 In practice, however, two
significant hurdles stand in the way of municipal liability as a mechanism for
police reform.
First, punitive damages are not available against municipalities via a
Monell suit on the rationale that punitive damages would only penalize the
taxpayers. 69 The absence of punitive damages-a remedy designed to deter
unlawful behavior-means any resulting judgment (or threat thereof) may be
insufficient to alter police practices, even assuming available compensatory
damages are sufficient to prompt victims to bring lawsuits in the first place. 70 In
essence, in many instances it is not worth the trouble even to initiate the suit.
Additionally, although attorney's fees in § 1983 cases are recoverable under
certain circumstances, 7' without the possibility of a lawyer being able to share in

65.
See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REv. 885, 892-95
(2014) (explaining the historical basis and scope of modem qualified immunity doctrine).
66.
See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (establishing the "clearly established" law
standard for qualified immunity cases); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988) (explaining that
"[w]hen officials are threatened with personal liability ... they may ... be induced to act with an excess
of caution .. . in ways that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria that
ought to guide their conduct").
67. Schwartz, supra note 65, at 912-13 (showing that officers were responsible for paying
judgments, settlements, or legal fees in a mere 0.41 percent of cases).
68.
Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) (establishing that a § 1983
plaintiff may recover from a government agency based on the actions of an employee); accord City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379 (1989) (concluding that a municipality may be liable for the actions
of an employee under § 1983 if the municipality was deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that a
constitutional violation would occur through its failure to train or oversee officers).
69.
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (immunizing
municipalities from punitive damage awards in § 1983 cases).
70. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)
(punitive damages are "intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing").
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [§] 1983 ...
the court; in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs."); see SHELDON NAHMOD, CIvIL RIGHTS AND CrIL LIBERTIES
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an award of punitive damages, victims who cannot afford to hire counsel on their
own may have a difficult time finding legal representation.
Second, the organization of local governments works to prevent police
departments from ever internalizing the costs of Monell suits. As Professors
Samuel Walker and Morgan Macdonald explain, "[O]ne agency of government,
the police department, commits abuses of rights, another agency, the city
attorney's office, defends the conduct in court, and a third agency, the city
72
treasurer, pays whatever financial settlement results from the litigation." Given
the absence of punitive damages and the fact that police departments might not
bear the costs of any financial award obtained in litigation, departments may
have little incentive to undertake reform efforts on their own.
More generally, the shortcomings of § 1983 litigation are exacerbated by
challenges that apply to virtually all civil litigation such as the cost of bringing
the claim, the difficulty of obtaining an effective lawyer, and other similar
procedural barriers. 73 In sum, while civil litigation may prove a viable remedy in
some cases of police misconduct, it does not serve well as a regulatory
mechanism.
3.

CriminalProsecution

Criminal prosecution of police officers also fails as an adequate regulatory
tool. Most criminal law is state law and thus prosecutions of officers in state
court confront several significant barriers that can prove fatal to obtaining a
conviction. While federal law has attempted to provide a solution, prosecution
under the federal statute is limited.
In many state prosecutions, fellow officers are responsible for investigating
cases of alleged criminal wrongdoing, and, as a result, cases might never get off
the ground. 74 For instance, the department might make a case against an officer
low priority. Investigating officers might also decline to pursue leads with the
same vigor they bring to other cases, or decide witnesses are biased against the
police and thus unreliable. In another instance, investigators might downplay
evidence that in a different case would be deemed probative. Or they might give
LmGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983, at § 10:1-10:52 (4th ed. 2016) (discussing the complexities
associated with obtaining and calculating attorney's fees under in section 1983 claims).
72. Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: A
Model State "Patternor Practice"Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.RL.J. 479,495 (2009).
See, e.g., Robert E. Litan, Speeding Up Civil Justice, 73 JUDICATURE 162, 162 (1989)
73.
("[H]igh costs of litigating in America unreasonably impede access to the civil justice system .... );
Robert J. Rhee, Toward ProceduralOptionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 514, 517 (2009) (concluding that "low value disputes are not prosecuted because litigation cost
can impose an insurmountable ... barrier"); Joan Grace Ritchey, Limits on Justice: The United States'
Failure to Recognize a Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 317, 318-31 (2001)
(reporting on difficulties of access to counsel).
74. John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 804 (citing
California as a state where "investigations of police misconduct are conducted by the Internal Affairs
Division ofthe suspect officer's own department").
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an alleged officer-perpetrator more regular benefits of doubts and be susceptible
to signals from other officers who oppose the investigation. In some
circumstances, outright interference with the investigation might occur, for
example through destruction of evidence. 75 Even if an investigation proceeds, a
further roadblock might emerge. Prosecutors, dependent upon their own
relationships with local law enforcement, are often reluctant to pursue criminal
charges against the police. 76
One solution to these localized conflicts of interest is prosecution by the
federal government under 18 U.S.C. § 242, which provides that "[w]hoever,
under color of any law .

.

. willfully subjects any person in any State .

.

. to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States ... shall be fined ... or imprisoned." 77
Yet limited prosecutorial resources have left this statute underutilized; the DOJ
only has resources to investigate and bring charges in a small portion of cases. 78
In addition, in Screws v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the term
"willfully" under § 242 requires prosecutors to demonstrate that an officer acted
with the knowledge and intent that his or her actions would cause a deprivation
of civil rights. 79 As a result of this interpretation, federal prosecutors have found
winning § 242 cases to be extremely challenging. 0
More generally, criminal prosecution is only ever possible when an officer
actually violates an applicable criminal statute. Existing criminal laws do not
address a good deal of police misconduct.8 1 In addition, criminal cases by their
very nature impose heightened proof requirements. Unless the officer pleads
guilty, conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, even when
cases get to trial, juries (and judges when they act as fact finders) have proven

75.
See, e.g., Rikki King, Arlington Officer Fired for Destroying Evidence Against Him,
HERALD NET (July 27, 2016), http://www.heraldnet.com/news/arlington-officer-fired-for-destroyingevidence-against-him [https://perma.cc/7LSC-JP4N] (describing how an officer destroyed evidence
relevant to an internal investigation into his conduct); Emily Previti, FormerPolice Chief Coveredfor
Offlicer, Destroyed Evidence, WITF (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.witf.org/news/2016/03/report-formerpolice-chief-covered-for-officer-destroyed-evidence.php [https://perma.cc/3KFK-KLYE] (showing an
example of a police chief who destroyed evidence relevant to an internal investigation of an officer).
76. Jacobi, supra note 74, at 804 (describing how prosecutors face "an impossible conflict of
interest between their desire to maintain working relationships and their duty to investigate and prosecute
police brutality") (internal citation omitted).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012).
78. Rushin, FederalEnforcement of Police Reform, supra note 49, at 3203 (reporting that
between 1981 and 1990, the DOJ only had resources to investigate 30-40 percent of § 242 complaints
and brought charges in 1 percent of cases).
79. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
80. Jacobi, supra note 74, at 809-11 (describing how "[the] Screws specific intent element
deters federal prosecutions of police misconduct").
8 1. Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 815, 842 n.138 (1999) (claiming that criminal prosecution only
captures a small subset of the most egregious police misconduct).
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reluctant to enter guilty verdicts against police officers. 82 For all of these reasons,
criminal liability is not well suited to addressing the range of officer misconduct
that exists today.
Combined, the barriers to criminal prosecution have limited its usefulness
as a weapon to fight police wrongdoing.
4.

StructuralReform Litigation

Recognizing the inadequacy of traditional tools to address abusive police
conduct, Congress has empowered the DOJ to bring structural reform litigation
(SRL) against police departments. Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the Attorney
General has the authority to seek equitable relief against police departments
engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct." However, use
of this mechanism has also faced significant hurdles.
Although public and private litigants had used SRL for decades to reform
prisons and schools, a pair of judicial decisions prevented simply applying
existing statutory measures to police departments. First, in 1976 the Supreme
Court held in Los Angeles v. Lyons that a private plaintiff did not have standing
to initiate SRL against a police department unless the plaintiff could prove a real,
immediate, and continuing threat of injury.8 In Lyons, an LAPD officer had used
a chokehold on the plaintiff,85 but the Court held that since the plaintiff could not
86
prove a substantial likelihood that he would be subject to a chokehold again,
87
he lacked standing to initiate SRL to enjoin the behavior.
A few years later, the DOJ sought an injunction against the Philadelphia
Police Department (PPD) after concluding that the PPD engaged in systemic
88
misconduct that violated the Constitution. However, in United States v. City of
Philadelphia,the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the DOJ
89
likewise lacked the necessary standing to initiate SRL against the PPD. After
Lyons and City of Philadelphia, it appeared that until authorized by Congress,
nobody had the requisite standing to initiate SRL against police departments.
Congress made SRL available after the 1991 video of LAPD officers
beating Rodney King on the side of a California highway." In the wake of this
82. Asit S. Panwala, The FailureofLocal and FederalProsecutorsto Curb Police Brutality, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 643-48 (2003) (discussing problems of burdens of proof in prosecutions
against officers).
83. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 210401, 108 Stat. 1796,2071 (1994).
84. 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983).
85. Id. at 97.
86. Id. at 111-13.
87. Id
88. UnitedStates v. City ofPhiladelphia,644 F.2d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 1980).
89. Id at 206 ("[W]e will hold the Attorney General to the same pleading requirements we
demand of a private litigant who brings an action under the Civil Rights Acts.").
90. See Seth Mydans, Seven Minutes in Los Angeles-A Special Report: Videotaped Beating by
1991),
18,
(Mar.
Officers Puts Full Glare on Brutality Issue, N.Y. TIMES
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event, the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights convened a
hearing on police brutality in the United States. 9' Invoking the Rodney King
incident, Democratic members of the subcommittee bemoaned the inadequacy
of existing legal remedies for police misconduct and championed SRL as the
means to overhaul problematic police departments like the LAPD. 92 Civil rights
advocates also testified as to the benefits of the approach. 93
Following the subcommittee hearing, several members of Congress
introduced the Police Accountability Act of 199 1.94 The Act authorized the U.S.
Attorney General to seek equitable relief against police departments engaged in
a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct. 9 5 Although the measure failed
to become law in 1991,96 a similar provision was enacted as part of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 199497 and codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 14141.
Section 14141 has allowed the DOJ to make important strides in reforming
some of the nation's most troubled police departments, including those of Los
Angeles; Washington, DC; Seattle; New Orleans; Newark; Cleveland;
Cincinnati; and Pittsburgh. 98 In these cases, the DOJ has successfully obtained
equitable relief by forcing municipalities to allocate resources to police reform
and empowering supportive local police leaders to make important policy
changes that would have otherwise been politically impractical. 99 These cases
have focused on reforming use of force policies, establishing internal oversight
mechanisms, overhauling complaint procedures, improving officer training,
ensuring bias-free policing, and promoting community policing.100 At the same
time, however, reform under § 14141 has been limited for three reasons.
First, the DOJ only has the resources to pursue a small number of SRL cases
each year. Between 1994 and 2013, the DOJ has pursued an average of around
three investigations pursuant to § 14141 annually, resulting in just one reform
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/18/us/seven-minutes-los-angeles-special-report-videotaped-beatingofficers-puts-full.html [https://perma.cc/YC6W-BE8A] (reporting on Rodney King incident).
91. See Police Brutality: HearingBefore the H. Subcomm. on Civil and Const. Rights of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1991).
92. Id. at 131 (describing as "very, very useful" DOJ authority to bring pattern or practice
litigation) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards).
93. Id. at 54-118, 61 ("If there is a pattern or practice of abuse, the Justice Department ought to
be able to deal with it. . . .") (statement of ACLU of Southern California Legal Director Paul Hoffman).
94. See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLuM. L. REv. 1384, 1402-03 (2000) (reporting on
legislative history).
9 5. Id.
96. Joan Biskupic, Crime Measure Is a CasualtyofPartisanSkirmishing, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 3528,3530 (1991).
97. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210401,
108 Stat. 1796, 2071 (1994).
98. Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, supra note 44, at
1378 (reporting on localities targeted under § 14141).
99. Id. at 1396-408 (reporting on effectiveness of SRL).
100. Id. at 1378-87 (describing each of these sort of reforms in turn).

2017]

FROMSELMA TO FERGUSON

28 1

case actually brought per year.' 0' Given that there are around 18,000 law
enforcement agencies in the United States,1 0 2 the probability that any given
police department will be subject to SRL via § 14141 in any given year is close
to zero. Put differently, even if a pattern or practice of misconduct is present in
just one of every one hundred police departments, the DOJ is capable of
03
investigating just 2 percent of those departments each year.1
A second problem is that reform depends very heavily on cooperation from
police departments. While the DOJ has succeeded in reforming police
departments that have been compliant partners, other departments have proven
resistant to reform because of local opposition to federal intervention.' The
point underscores a fundamental limitation of SRL as a regulatory mechanism:
it only works when local officials buy into the reform process and actively
05
participate in achieving solutions.
Specifically, where the DOJ has been able to leverage the structure of
municipal governments and generate cooperation from relevant municipal
06
officials, it is able to achieve favorable settlements in § 14141 cases.1 By
contrast, as the recent case of the Alamance County Sheriffs Department in
North Carolina demonstrates, § 14141 falters when there is local resistance. In
that case, which involved racially biased policing practices, 0 7 the DOJ was
unable to reach a settlement with the police department or the county and went

101.
102.

Rushin, FederalEnforcement of Police Reform, supra note 49, at 3244-47.
BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW

ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csl1ea08.pdf
[https://permacc/3Z93-DD74].
103. Rushin, FederalEnforcement of Police Reform, supra note 49, at 3230.
104. For example, the DOJ sought to overhaul the Alamance County Sheriffs Department, but
ultimately failed to prove its case in the first federal § 14141 trial. See Michael D. Abernethy, Judge
Dismisses DOJ Case Against Johnson, Finds No Evidence of UnconstitutionalPractices,TIMES-NEWS
2 3
http://www.thetimesnews.com/article/20150807/NEWS/150809 8
2015),
7,
(Aug.
[https://perma.cc/XV25-PC7U].
105. Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, supra note 44, at
1416-18 (documenting need for local support in successful use of § 14141).
Specifically, the DOJ has proven adept at working directly with local officials (including
106.
city attorneys, mayors, managers, and council members) in ways that bypass police departments and
force reform. Id. at 1400-01.
107. The DOJ believed that Sheriff Terry Johnson in Alamance County, North Carolina was
engaged in a pattern ofracially charged policing tactics; a full-scale investigation by theDOJ concluded
that Sheriff Johnson was in violation of § 14141. See ACLU Urges Alamance Sheriff to Comply with
DOJ Requests in Light of Lawsuit, ACLU (Dec. 20, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-urgesalamance-sheriff-comply-doj-requests-light-lawsuit?redirect-crinnal-law-reform-imnmigrantsrights/aclu-urges-alamance-sheriff-comply-doj-requests-light-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/N92H-JSQZ];
Colin Campbell, McCrory Honors Alamance County Sherif Facing Federal Allegations of Racial
Profiling, NEWS & OBSERVER (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics[https://perma.cc/LHN7government/politics-columns-blogs/under-the-dome/articlel0198235.html
43N3]; David Zucchino, Sherif's Treatment ofLatinos Splits Town: A North Carolina Lawman
Practices DiscriminatoryPolicing, the Justice Department Says, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2012, at A13.
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to trial.108 Ultimately, the federal district court held that the DOJ failed to prove
a pattern or practice of misconduct. 109 As a result, the misconduct giving rise to
the allegation was left unchanged-and the shortcomings of § 14141 exposed.
Third, § 14141 suffers from a problem that plagues all existing tools to
combat police misconduct: a lack of comprehensive data that could serve as the
basis for proving that a violation exists and reform is needed. The federal
government currently compiles little data on police behavior.1 10 It lacks data on
such things as the frequency of officer use of force, wrongful stops and arrests,
civilian complaints against police, and even on the number of civilians killed by
law enforcement.I1
In October 2016, the DOJ announced that in early 2017 it would start
collecting nationwide data on police shootings and other violent encounters with
the public. It remains to be seen whether such efforts will bear fruit. 112 As a

result, the DOJ is currently in a poor position to assess the comparative levels of
misconduct across police departments and identify the worst offenders.
Therefore, when deployed, SRL has proven effective in many respects, but it is
not a tool that can easily generate more widespread reform.
5.

Summary

In sum, the current array of legal mechanisms to fight police misconductthe exclusionary rule, civil litigation, federal prosecution, and federally initiated
structural reform litigation-all suffer from similar defects. These mechanisms
rely on piecemeal, reactive litigation-a strategy that is woefully inadequate to
securing widespread and enduring reform. Police officers who violate individual
rights face little risk of being held liable for their actions or of being otherwise
sanctioned. Although the federal government has powers to investigate and
pursue police misconduct, current constraints-resource limits, a lack of data,
evidentiary requirements, and evasive tactics by police departments-limit the
punch those powers can deliver.
These problems are not unprecedented. Five decades ago, similar hurdles
stood in the way of remedying racial discrimination in voting rights. Recognizing
the limits of the existing tools to confront such discrimination, Congress adopted

108. Emery P. Dalesio, Attorney: NC Sheriff Won't Settle ProfilingClaims, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2012/sep/26/attomey-nc-sheriff-wontsettle-profiling-claims [https://perma.cc/VWY5-82K4] (discussing a case in which the DOJ was not able
to negotiate a settlement that entails reforms, and was forced to take the case to trial).
109. Abernethy, supra note 104.
110. Eric Lichtblau, Justice Department to Track Use of Force by Police Across US., N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2016, at A12 (describing the general lack of adequate data on police behavior).
111. Id. (describing how the DOJ has historically failed to keep track of individuals killed by law
enforcement or use of force incidents; further describing how the federal government has sought to
correct these gaps in the existing data).
112. Id.
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a whole new approach with the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Congress could take
a similar approach to remedy police misconduct.
II.
BLUEPRINT: VOTING RIGHTS

The VRA represented an extraordinary response to the seemingly
intractable problem of discrimination against Black citizens who sought to vote.
Prior efforts to protect voting rights in the federal courts and through other forms
of federal intervention had consistently come up short. Litigation was slow,
costly, and dependent upon evidence that often lay in the hands of violators
themselves. The risk of any particular locality facing sanction was always slim;
and when one discriminatory practice was stamped out, another took its place.
These circumstances, which led to the innovations of the VRA, mirror in
important respects conditions that exist today with respect to police misconduct.
The experience in addressing voter discrimination-a seemingly entrenched
problem at its time-sheds important light on how to address the problem of
police practices that violate constitutional rights particularly of minority citizens.
The issues are not, of course, identical. Applying lessons from the historical
experience with voting reform to the contemporary problem of policing requires
careful attention to differences between the two scenarios. Once such differences
are taken into account, however, the VRA provides an exceedingly useful
blueprint for police reform efforts.
A.

The Fifteenth Amendment

The VRA represented the culmination of nearly a century of efforts at the
federal level to protect the ability of Black citizens to vote. Those efforts started
with the Fifteenth Amendment. Ratified in 1870, it provided in Section 1 that the
"right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.""' Section 2 of the Amendment empowered Congress to enforce
the Section 1 command "by appropriate legislation."ll 4 Pursuant to that power,
Congress enacted the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871, which prohibited, by
criminal penalty, discrimination by state officials in voter registration as well as
certain private interferences with voting (and other federal) rights.' 15
Yet neither the clear command of the Fifteenth Amendment nor the early
implementing statutes secured voting rights. While state laws no longer
specifically limited voting to White citizens, by the 1890s, southern states had
enacted literacy tests, registration requirements, property qualifications, good
character tests, and a slew of other devices designed to prevent Black citizens

113.
114.
115.

U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
Id. §2.
16 Stat. 140, § 1-2 (1870); 16 Stat 433, § 1(1871).
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from voting. Grandfather clauses and selective enforcement of these measures
ensured White citizens were able to exercise the franchise.1 '6 As a result of these
tests-and intimidation of and violence towards would-be voters-Black
registration and voting rates in the South were very low, typically in the single
percentage digits.1 17
From a modem perspective, it may be hard to appreciate how deeply
entrenched discriminatory voting practices were during the nineteenth century
and a good part of the twentieth-and how difficult it proved to end those
practices. The Fifteenth. Amendment and its Enforcement Acts were simply no
match for the widespread interference with voting that occurred-and thus it
remained a basic feature of American life.
Mirroring the difficulties of using civil litigation to reform police
misconduct, private litigants rarely brought cases under the early voting rights
statutes and piecemeal litigation was ineffective in producing general and longlasting reform.118 Beginning with a pair of decisions in 1915 invalidating
grandfather clause exemptions that benefited White voters," the Supreme Court
provided some relief but not enough to guarantee equality in voting. 120
Even though the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited denying the right to vote
on the basis of race, discriminatory practices stood in the way of voting equality.
While Congress and the Supreme Court tried to provide some relief, they were
unsuccessful in fully securing voting rights. In the late 1950s, Congress began
passing a series of Civil Rights Acts, which laid the foundation for the VRA.

116. See GARY MAY, BENDING TOwARD JUSTICE: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, at xi-xii (2013).
See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
117.
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 32 (2004) (stating that Black voter registration in Louisiana was
only 1.1 percent in 1904; 2 percent in Mississippi in 1892; 5 percent in Florida in 1896).
118. MAY,supra note 116, at65.
119. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364 (1915); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 38182(1915).
120. In 1939, the Court invalidated a grandfather exemption to a registration deadline. Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939). In 1944, the Court invalidated "white primary" laws. Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944). In 1960, the Court invalidated racially discriminatory registration
challenges. United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58, 59 (1960). The Court also invalidated racial
gerrymandering in Tuskegee, Alabama. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960). And in a
series of cases beginning in 1949, the Court invalidated discriminatory uses of voting tests. See
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965) (holding that provisions of the Louisiana
Constitution and statutes "requir[ing] voters to satisfy registrars of their ability to understand and give
reasonable interpretations of any section of Federal or State Constitution violated" the Fifteenth
Amendment and the 1957 Act); Alabama v. United States, 371 U.S. 37 (1962) (per curiam) (affirming
circuit court that under the 1957 Voting Rights Act, in a suit brought by the United States, a district court
may order the registration of specified voters found to have been discriminatorily denied registration
because of their race); Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (per curiam) (affirming district court
decision invalidating under Fifteenth Amendment provision of Alabama constitution requiring
registrants to "understand and explain any article of the constitution of the United States in the English
language").
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B. Litigating Voting Rights
The Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 included new statutory
provisions to protect voting rights. However, because those provisions also
operated in a piecemeal fashion and were dependent upon adjudication by courts,
their benefits soon proved limited.
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 empowered the Attorney General to bring
suits to protect the right to vote from deprivation or interference because of race
or color.12' The Act prohibited threats and intimidations for the purpose of
interfering with the right to vote in federal elections and gave the Attorney
General authority to bring suits against individuals engaging in such behavior.1 22
Further, the Act established a Civil Rights Commission with the power to
identify and investigate discriminatory mechanisms that abridged the right to
vote. 123
As the Attorney General brought lawsuits under the 1957 statute, it became
clear that successful litigation required access to voting records to demonstrate
that Black citizens were in fact treated differently than their White
counterparts.1 24 Thus, the Civil Rights Act of 1960 made the Attorney General
responsible for compiling state voting statistics in order to establish the presence
of a pattern or practice of racial discrimination.1 25 In addition, Congress plainly
recognized that if the federal government were to prevail in a lawsuit, it would
need to enact concrete measures to ensure localities did not revert back to
unlawful conduct. Thus, the statute permitted courts, by way of remedy, to
appoint federal registrars with powers to register prospective voters at the state
level. As a result, the federal government did not need to return to court to seek
further judicial assistance in registering voters: federal executive officers had
power to complete the registrations themselves.
Four years later, Congress created additional tools to attack discriminatory
voting practices. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided for the expedition of
voting suits and their trial before a three-judge district court with a direct appeal
to the Supreme Court.1 26 The statute also prohibited newly adopted voter
qualifications in elections for federal offices, denial of voter registration because
of immaterial errors in completing registration forms, and literacy tests as a

121. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 131 (c), 71 Stat. 637 (codified as amended
at 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012)).
122. Id.
123. Id. § 105, 71 Stat. 635.
124. Civil Rights Act of 1960: HearingsBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 9
(1960) ("In many cases, discrimination in registration can be proved only by comparing the records of
Negro applicants with those of White applicants. At the present time, the Government lacks any
procedure by which to compel the production of these records before a suit is filed.").
125. Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat 86 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C.
§ 10101 (2012)).
126. Civil Rights Act of1964, Pub. L.No. 88-352, § 101(3)(h), 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
at 52 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012)).
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27
and it created a
qualification for voting unless conducted in writing,'
(rebuttable) presumption of literacy for applicants who had completed the sixth

grade.1

28

Although Congress enacted the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964
to end discrimination in voting, the overall benefits were modest. In 1960, only
28 percent of eligible Black citizens in southern states were registered to vote;
by 1964 the figure had climbed to just 38 percent.12 9 Neither a constitutional
amendment nor a series of federal statutory measures were adequate to end
discriminatory voting practices. With millions of citizens still denied the
franchise, it took the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to produce more sweeping
reform.
C. Selma and the 1965 Act
While the 1964 reforms were more aggressive than any before, they were
barely in effect when Congress acted again with a sweeping federal statute
known as the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Soon after his landslide victory in the
1964 election, President Lyndon Johnson, back in office on the promise of a
Great Society, set to work on further civil rights reforms. On December 14, 1964,
Johnson instructed Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to prepare a new
voting rights law' 30 and by March 1 of the following year, DOJ staffers had
drafted an expanded Voting Rights Act.131
Initially, senior members of Johnson's staff, including Katzenbach himself,
had reservations about moving forward with further federal intervention in state
and local election practices.132 Historically, states and localities controlled
election processes and federal interventions altered the balance between national
and state/local power in an important domain of governmental authority. While
it might seem natural today to have strong federal oversight of elections, in the
1960s virtually everyone would have recognized the shift in the balance of power
that such oversight entailed-and the attendant political opposition any
proposals would produce. So too, a proposal for greater federal intervention in
police practices-also an area historically of state and local power-implicates
important federalism issues and would likely generate resistance on that basis.
The VRA experience both shows that such resistance is not new and can be
overcome.

127.
128.

Id. § 101(2)(A)-(C).
Id. § 101(3)(c).

RICHARD K ScHER, POLITICS IN THE NEW SOUTH: REPUBLICANISM, RACE AND
129.
LEADERSHIP IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 250 (2d ed. 1997).
130.
NICK KOTZ, JUDGMENT DAYS: LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.,
AND THE LAWS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 245 (2005).

131. See MAY, supra note 116, at 95.
132. For example, Horace Busby, an aide and advisor to President Johnson, worried that the bill
would mark "a return to Reconstruction." Id.
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Within the Johnson administration, all doubts about the need for a stronger
federal voting law gave way with the violence that accompanied the Selma to
Montgomery civil rights march on "Bloody Sunday," March 7, 1965.133 The
march was the catalyst for the VRA's passage in August of 1965. The fifty-four
mile march, led by a coalition of civil rights organizations, aimed to draw
attention to interference with Black voter registration. 13 4 State troopers and local
residents beat and tear-gassed marchers at the Edmund Pettus Bridge.135 Two
days later, Martin Luther King Jr. led a second march that turned back when it
arrived at a police barricade at the same bridge. 136 Martin Luther King Jr. and
the marchers only completed the march after President Lyndon Johnson
federalized the Alabama National Guard to protect the marchers from
violence.1 37
On March 15, President Johnson presented his voting rights bill at a
nationally televised joint session of Congress.1 38 The VRA was introduced in the
House on March 17, 1965, and in the Senate the next day. 139 Recognizing the
need for bipartisan support, President Johnson enlisted the Republican minority
leader, Illinois Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, to help prepare and shepherd
the bill. 140 Passage of the legislation was by no means certain. Southern
representatives vigorously opposed the bill as an undue-and in their view
unconstitutional-interference with state powers. 141
On the other hand, some members of Congress, led by Senator Ted
Kennedy, thought the proposed bill did not actually go far enough. Among other
things, Senator Kennedy sought to add a provision barring poll taxes (already
prohibited in federal elections under the Twenty-fourth Amendment) in state and
local elections.142 After Senator Kennedy's proposed amendment narrowly
failed, 143 the bill passed with bipartisan support and President Johnson signed it
into law on August 6, 1965.14 At the signing ceremony, President Johnson
described the franchise as "the most powerful instrument ever devised by man
for breaking down injustice and destroying the terrible walls which imprison men
because they are different from other men." 45
133. Id. A draft of the VRA was completed six days before the Edmund Pettus Bridge incident
134. See id. at 80-84.
135. Id. at 85-89.
136. Id. at 90, 99-104.
137. Id. at 130.
138. Special Message to the Congress on the Right to Vote, 1 PUB. PAPERS 287 (Mar. 15, 1965).
139. See H.R. 6400, 89th Cong. (1965); S. 1564, 89th Cong. (1965) (enacted); 111 CONG. REC.
5176, 5227-28 (1965).
140.

See MAY, supra note 116, at 95.

141. See Part IV.A.1 infra.
142. See MAY, supra note 116, at 157-58.
143. Id. at 159. The Kennedy amendment was defeated by just four votes. Id
144. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 and 52 U.S.C.).
145. Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the Signing of the Voting Rights Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS
840, 842 (Aug. 6, 1965).
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Nearly a century after ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment and after
several failed efforts to end racial discrimination in voting, Congress had
produced a statutory scheme with new and dramatic tools to equalize access to
the voting booth.
D. Key Provisions
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a product of its time. Pervasive voter
discrimination, enforced through violence that culminated in the events at Selma,
and a history of failed federal reforms of the past created the conditions for
enactment and use of a sweeping law.
The VRA was both retrospective, targeting existing ways in which states
and localities impeded voting rights, and anticipatory, heading off new tactics of
voter suppression. The VRA's specific provisions reflected the fact that earlier
federal voting laws, dependent upon litigation and judicially imposed remedies,
had proven ineffective at curbing abuses and thus a new, more radical approach
was needed. 14 6 Most significantly, in place of piecemeal litigation, which
required proof of discriminatory practices, the VRA established federal oversight
of statutorily designated jurisdictions. These jurisdictions were required to
demonstrate progress in order to be released from federal supervision.
While the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had some similarities to the Civil
Rights Acts of previous years, it included significant new measures to combat
voting discrimination. Like its predecessor laws, the VRA prohibited, in Section
2, racially discriminatory voting practices1 47 and included a provision for
litigation by the DOJ and private plaintiffs to enforce the requirements of the
Fifteenth Amendment. 148
The innovative parts of the 1965 Act were the coverage formula of Section
4149 and the accompanying preclearance requirements of Section 5.15o Under
Section 4(b), states or their political subdivisions became "covered" if they used
any test or device as a condition for voter registration on November 1, 1964, and
either less than 50 percent of voting age persons were registered to vote on that
date or less than 50 percent voted in the presidential election that year.s1 In other
words, the statute made the presence of a test or device combined with low

146. See Alexander Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REv. 79, 79 (explaining that
the VRA was "enacted .. . as a substitute for litigation, which had proved a sadly inadequate engine of
reform").
147. Voting Rights Act § 2 ("No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.").
148. Id. §§ 3, 11, 12(a)-(d). The Supreme Court interpreted the VRA to allow private lawsuits in
Allen v. State Board ofElections, 393 U.S. 544, 561 (1969).
149. Id. § 4, 79 Stat. 438-39.
150. Id. § 5, 79 Stat. 439.
151. Id. § 4(b), 79 Stat. 438.
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participation evidence of discrimination without any further proof.152 As a result
of this formula, in 1965 six states in their entirety became covered jurisdictionsAlabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia-along
with a swath of thirty-nine counties in North Carolina and one county in
Arizona. 5 3
Section 4 of the VRA also banned all tests or devices in covered
jurisdictions,1 54 but the most impactful tool was Section 5. It provided that
changes in voting procedures could not take effect in a covered jurisdiction
unless first approved by either the Attorney General or a three-judge district
court in Washington, DC.155 In other words, the VRA froze the power of covered
states and counties to regulate voting without federal approval.' Moreover, in
order to obtain "preclearance," the jurisdiction itself was required to prove that
the proposed change in voting procedures had neither "the purpose [nor] ... the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 57
As such, Section 5 prevented states and political subdivisions from adopting new
discriminatory practices that the VRA had not specifically anticipated.
While the VRA represented a radical intervention into state and local
government, it did provide a means for states and localities to escape federal
oversight. Covered jurisdictions could bail out of the preclearance requirements
if they could prove a five-year record of no discrimination.158 That said, no state
has been able to bail out of coverage, but political subdivisions have successfully
done so.

59

The VRA also provided for the appointment of federal voting examiners.
Courts could appoint examiners as part of a remedial measure in a lawsuit

152.
The statute defined test or device broadly as "any requirement that a person as a prerequisite
for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret
any matter; (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject; (3)
possess good moral character; or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or
members of any other class." Id. § 4(c), 79 Stat. 438.
153. 28 C.F.R pt. 51, app. (2015). For a breakdown of voting rates at the time of consideration
of the bill, see FactSheet on Voting Rights, CONG. Q., Mar. 19, 1965, at 429-33.
154. Voting Rights Act § 4(a).
155. Id. § 5.
156.
In practice, most proposed voting changes were submitted to the Attorney General (rather
&

than the court). See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
REAUTHORIZATION: THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S RECORD OF ENFORCING THE TEMPORARY

VOTING RIGHTS ACT PROVISIONS 5 (2006), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/051006VRAStatReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/26RM-EP7W] ("The Division receives more than 99 percent of all section 5
preclearance submissions."). The number of such proposals increased over time: there were 1,542 made
between 1965-1974; 13,874 between 1975-1981; and 101,641 between 1982-2004. Id. at 23.
157. Voting Rights Act § 5.
158. Id.§4(a).
159. See JurisdictionsCurrentlyBailed Out, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/
section-4-voting-rights-act#bailout [https://perma.cc/DSP6-B2MW] (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).
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instituted by the Attorney General.1 60 More significantly, the Attorney General
could determine that examiners were needed in political subdivisions covered by
Section 4(b). Under the statute, the Civil Service Commission was required to
appoint voting examiners whenever the Attorney General certified either of the
following: (1) that the Attorney General had received meritorious written
complaints from at least twenty residents alleging that they have been
disenfranchised under color of law because of their race, or (2) that the
appointment of examiners was otherwise necessary to effectuate the guarantees
of the Fifteenth Amendment.161 The Attorney General was to make the second
determination by considering, among other factors, whether the registration ratio
of nonwhites to whites was reasonably attributable to racial discrimination, or
whether there was evidence of good faith efforts to comply with the Fifteenth
Amendment.1 62 These certifications by the Attorney General were not
reviewable in any court.1 63
The power of the examiners lay in registration. Under the VRA, the
examiners were required to test the voting qualifications of applicants (according
to regulations of the Civil Service Commission prescribing times, places,
procedures, and forms).'6 The examiner was to place "promptly" on a list of
eligible voters "[a]ny person" the examiner found "to have the qualifications
prescribed by State law not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States." 6 5
In sum, federal officials could simply bypass state and local registration
decisions (or lack of action). Examiners were required to transmit their lists at
least once a month to the appropriate state or local officials, who were required
by the statute to place the listed names on the official voting rolls. '6 Any person
listed by an examiner was then entitled to vote in all elections held more than
forty-five days after the examiner transmitted that person's name.1 67 While the
law provided a mechanism for state officials to challenge the registration, again
the tables were turned: the state had to prove the individual was actually
ineligible to vote. 168

160. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 3(a), 120 Stat. 578 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. § 10305 (2012)).
161. Voting Rights Act § 6(b).
162. Id.
163. Id. §4(b).
164. Id §§ 7(a), 9(b).
165. Id. § 7(b).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. §§ 7(b), 9(a). Other provisions of the VRA authorized the appointment of election
observers, id. § 8, and directed the Attorney General to litigate the constitutionality of poll taxes, id. §§
10(a), 10(b), and (in areas where examiners had been appointed) authorized federal courts to order that
the counting of ballots by individuals denied access to the polls on election day were counted and
included in the total vote, id. § 12(e).
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These provisions reflected the problem with past efforts to enforce voting
rights. The principal motivation of the 1965 Act was that the case-based
approach to remedying voting discrimination was ineffective. Piecemeal
litigation was slow, expensive, 169 and required proof that officials were applying
seemingly neutral requirements in a discriminatory manner. While the federal
government invariably prevailed in voting rights cases it took to court, 17 0 when
a case invalidated one practice, states and localities simply employed another
tactic to prevent Black citizens from exercising the franchise-thus necessitating
a new round of litigation.17 1
At the same time, because no statutory response to voting discrimination
would be absolutely precise, under the VRA some state conduct that was
arguably not unconstitutional could well be swept into the new federal regime.
In justifying the two components of the coverage formula-use of a test or device
and low registration or voting in 1964-the House Committee observed that
"[t]he record . . . indicates that where these two factors are present there is a
strong probability that low registration and voting are a result of racial
discrimination in the use of such tests." 72 According to the committee's report,
"[d]ecisions of the Federal courts and the reports of the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission persuasively indicate that many of the States and political
subdivisions to which the formula applies have engaged in widespread violations
73
of the 15th amendment over a period of time."
The congressional report's references to "strong probability" and "many"
are instructive. The committee fully recognized that the formula would bring
some non-discriminating jurisdictions under federal oversight. 174 That result did
not, however, mandate a more precise formula given the possibility of bailout. 175

Likewise, the House Committee found that "most if not all of the tests and
devices affected are not capable of fair administration," which justified their
automatic suspension. 176 With respect to the appointment of examiners, the

169.
The Attorney General testified that each of the seventy-one voting rights cases filed by the
DOJ under the 1957, 1960, and 1964 Civil Rights Acts required six thousand man-hours just to "analyze
voting records in a single county." Voting Rights: HearingsBefore Subcomm. No. 5 of the Comm. on
the Judiciary,89th Cong. 5 (1965) (statement of Att'y Gen. Nicolas Katzenbach).
170. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 89-162, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2547 (1965) ("No
voting discrimination suit has ever been concluded without a judicial finding of racial discrimination by
either the district court or the court of appeals.").
171.
1965 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 2544-45 ("The inadequacy of existing [civil rights] laws is
attributable to both the intransigence of local officials and dilatory tactics, two factors which have largely
neutralized years of litigating effort by the Department of Justice.").
172. H.R. REP. No. 89-439 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2444.
1965 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 2445.
173.
174. Id.
175.
Id. at 2446 ("This provision for overturning the presumption or inference created by the
determinations in section 4 provides assurance that no State or subdivision will be treated unfairly and
that the suppression of tests and devices will be applied only to areas where it is necessary to enforce the
rights guaranteed under the 15th amendment.").
176. Id.
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committee also believed the law provided sufficient safeguards to protect states
and localities from unjustified federal intrusion.1 77
When applying the VRA framework to policing, it is useful to keep these
aspects of the 1965 statute in mind. The members of Congress who enacted the
VRA understood that voting discrimination was a complex problem. They
recognized localities differed in their makeup and practices, and exact indicators
of whether unconstitutional discrimination had occurred in any particular
instance did not exist. The lesson, in responding to police misconduct, is that
perfection-a perfectly tailored legislative response to civil rights violations-is
likely not feasible and should not be the goal in pursuing reform.
As originally enacted, the VRA was set to expire in five years.17 However,
Congress extended the statute-with certain updates and amendments-five
times, most recently with a twenty-five-year extension in 2006.179 In 1970,
Congress reauthorized the VRA for an additional five years, and extended the
coverage formula in Section 4(b) to jurisdictions that had a voting test and less
than 50 percent voter registration or turnout as of 1968.180 That change brought
within the set of covered jurisdictions several counties in California, New
Hampshire, and New York."' Congress also extended nationwide the ban (in
Section 4(a) of the 1965 Act) on denying citizens the right to vote on the ground
that they failed to comply with a test or device.1 82
In 1975, Congress reauthorized the VRA for seven more years and
extended its coverage to jurisdictions that had a voting test and less than fifty
percent voter registration or turnout as of 1972.183 The 1975 law also reached
beyond race. It amended the statutory definition of "test or device" to include
also English-only voting materials in jurisdictions where more than five percent
of voting-age citizens spoke a single language other than English.' " With these
changes, Alaska, Arizona, Texas, and certain counties in California, Florida,
Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota became covered
jurisdictions.185 In addition, the 1975 law made permanent the nationwide ban
on tests and devices.' 86

177. Id. at 2447-48 ("The appointment of examiners would not be automatic.... [Iln some areas
in which tests or devices are suspended, the appointment of examiners may not be necessary to effectuate
the guarantees of the 15th amendment. This could be the case where local election officials and entire
communities have demonstrated determination to assure full voting rights to all irrespective of race or
color.").
178. Voting Rights Act § 4(a).
179. See infra notes 180-192.
180. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, §§ 3-4, 84 Stat. 315.
181. See 28 C.F.R pt. 51, app. (2015).
182. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, § 6, 84 Stat. 315.
183. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, §§ 101, 202, 89 Stat. 400,401.
184. Id. § 203, 89 Stat. 401, 402.
185. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, app. (2015).
186. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, § 102, 89 Stat. 400.
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In 1982, Congress reauthorized the VRA for twenty-five years, but this
time it did not alter the coverage formula, instead leaving in place the earlier
baselines.'1 7 Congress also amended the bailout provisions to permit political
subdivisions of covered jurisdictions to bail out under certain circumstances. 188
In addition, Congress responded to the Supreme Court's decision in Mobile v.
Bolden, which held that Section 2 prohibited only those laws with a
discriminatory purpose, 189 by amending Section 2 to prohibit voting laws with a
discriminatory effect regardless of any discriminatory purpose.1 90
In 2006, Congress again reauthorized the VRA for twenty-five years, once
more without changing the coverage formula.191 Congress also extended the
reach of Section 5 to prohibit changes to voting laws made with "any
discriminatory purpose," as well as changes to voting laws that diminished the
ability of citizens, on account of race, color, or language minority status, "to elect
their preferred candidates of choice." 92 In so doing, Congress determined that
while there had been progress in eliminating "first-generation" barriers to ballot
access-and thus an increase in minority voting-"second-generation" barriers
remained a problem.' 9 Such second-generation barriers included racial
gerrymandering (redrawing of legislative districts to segregate races for purposes
of voting); use of a system of at-large voting in place of district-by-district voting
in cities with a sizable Black minority population; and discriminatory annexation
by incorporating majority-White areas into city limits. All of these barriers
reduced the effect of prior increases in Black voting.1 94 At the time of the 2006
reauthorization, multiple jurisdictions were still subject to preclearance
requirements, as a result of their history of discriminatory practices. Nine states
were wholly covered (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia), and six more states were
covered in part (California, Florida, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and
South Dakota).1 95

187. Voting Rights Act Amendments of1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205,96 Stat 131.
188. See id. §2, 96 Stat. 131-33.
189. 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980).
190. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, § 3, 96 Stat. 134; see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,
992 (1996) ("The results test of § 2 is an important part of the apparatus chosen by Congress to effectuate
this Nation's commitment 'to confront its conscience and fulfill the guarantee of the Constitution' with
respect to equality in voting.") (O'Connor, J., concurring).
191.
Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577.
192.
52 U.S.C. §§ 10304(b}-(d) & 10303(f)(2) (2012).
193.
Voting Rights Act: Evidence of Continued Need: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1614 (2006).
194. Id.; see also Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 §§ 2(b)(2)-(3), 120 Stat 577.
195. See Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEP'T JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5
[https://pemia.cc/DP4C-23VN]
(last visited Jan. 1, 2016).
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E. Impact
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is the most successful civil rights law in the
history of the United States.1 96 The impact of the 1965 Act was immediate and
dramatic. 197 By 1968, more than one million new Black voters were registered,1 98
a figure that included more than 50 percent of the Black voting-age population
in every southern state.1 99 The most dramatic immediate change occurred in
Alabama, where the percentage of Black Americans registered to vote rose from
11 percent in 1956 to 51.2 percent in 1966.200
Over the longer term, the Act delivered impressive (though not perfect) 201
results as the number of registered Black voters continued to climb 20 2 and the
historic gaps between Black and White registration rates narrowed. 203 In
addition, there was significant growth in the number of Black elected officials. 204
Most notably, by the time the Supreme Court heard Shelby County v. Holder,
"African-American voter turnout ha[d] come to exceed White voter turnout in
five of the six States originally covered by Section 5, with a gap in the sixth State
of less than one half of one percent." 205
The circumstances and challenges to voting rights, which led to the
innovations of the VRA, mirror in important respects conditions that exist today
with respect to police misconduct. With prior efforts to remedy police
misconduct having proved inadequate, the VRA model offers a way forward.
The VRA preclearance formula provides an example of how a new statutory

196.

See, e.g., DAVID J. BODENHAMER, THE REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTION (2012) ("[T]he

Voting Rights Act was the most successful civil rights act ever passed by Congress."); William J.
Consovoy & Thomas R. McCarthy, Shelby County v. Holder: The Restoration of ConstitutionalOrder,
in CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31 (2013) ("The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is possibly the most consequential
law in our nation's history."); Samuel Isasacharoff, Does Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Still Work?,
in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 107 (David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006) ("[T]he ... [VRA]
was successful beyond the scope of any other civil rights statute."); "Voting Rights Act," in 4
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY: 1896 TO THE PRESENT 57 (Paul Finkelman ed.,

2009) ("The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is generally considered the most successful piece of civil rights
legislation in the history of the United States.").
197.

See KEVIN J. COLEMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965:

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
[http://permacc/RQ4R-V5ZM].
198.

13

tbl.3

(2015),

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43626.pdf

RICHARD K. SCHER, PoLmcs IN THE NEW SOUTH: REPUBLICANISM, RACE AND

LEADERSHIP IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 250 (2d ed. 1997) (reporting an increase in the number of
Black citizens registered to vote from just under 2 million prior to the VRA to 3.3. million in 1968).
199.

U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 12-13 (1968).

200. See COLEMAN, supra note 197, at 13 thl.3.
201. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-196 (1975) (explaining "[t]hat minority political progress has
been made. . . is undeniable. However,. . .continuing and significant deficiencies yet exis[t] in minority
registration and political participation").
202. See id. at 6 (reporting, among other things, that in Mississippi while 6.7 percent of Black
citizens were registered to vote prior to 1965, by 1972 the estimated figure was 62.2 percent).
203.
See id. ("[C]losing registration gaps have occurred throughout the covered southern
jurisdictions.").
204. Id.
205. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133. S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013).
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framework could contribute to effectively remedying police practices that violate
civil rights.
III.
A NEW RESPONSE TO POLICE ISCONDUCT

A new federal statute modeled on the VRA to remedy police misconduct
would set out a coverage formula to identify the jurisdictions reached by the law
and the reforms to be imposed upon those jurisdictions. This Part takes up those
two issues in turn. It first examines, in Part III.A, how Congress could develop
an appropriate coverage formula. The analysis considers the complexities
associated with determining the nature and scope of police misconduct. 206 Part
III.B outlines a series of reforms that Congress could impose upon covered
jurisdictions.
A.

CoverageFormula

Congress should enact a federal coverage formula to address a range of
common forms of local police misconduct, including unlawful stops, searches,
seizures, and arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment; 207 excessive uses of
force in violation of the Fourth Amendment; 208 and racial profiling or otherwise
discriminatory police practices in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 209
This Section provides a detailed discussion of how Congress can undertake
that task. It does not, however, provide a ready-made coverage formula for
Congress to adopt. That choice is deliberate. The coverage formula will
determine which local police departments become subject to federally-imposed

206.
To be clear, we do not set out a ready-made coverage formula for Congress to adopt Just as
identifying an appropriate formula in the VRA required hearings, the compiling of various sources of
data, and debate over their usefulness, here, too, it would be premature just to settle on one formula at
the outset. Accordingly, we limit ourselves to identifying some key metrics and data requirements
associated with them. Likewise, while we identify some useful reforms, they are not deemed exhaustive.
207. The Fourth Amendment generally guarantees that a person has the ability to be "secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONsT.
amend. IV. Police officers typically need probable cause to execute a search or arrest. Such probable
cause must be made on an "individualized suspicion of wrongdoing." City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). In cases where an officer lacks probable cause but has reasonable suspicion that
a person may be engaged in a criminal act, the Fourth Amendment also permits a limited detainment.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
208.
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (finding that the force used by law
enforcement while conducting an arrest or investigatory stop is evaluated under the Fourth Amendment
and will be found to be excessive if it constitutes an "unreasonable" seizure). For example, police
officers may only use deadly force under the Fourth Amendment when they have probable cause to
believe that a suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others. Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).
209.
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (suggesting in dicta that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the selective or discriminatory enforcement
of the law); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976) (concluding that an Equal
Protection violation happens when the state's administration of a facially neutral law is motivated by a
discriminatory purpose and results in a discriminatory effect).
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reforns and federal governmental oversight. As with the VRA, it is Congress
that should settle on a specific coverage formula. The task of deciding on the
criteria underlying the coverage formula is both complex and politically
sensitive.
The complexities will require Congress to use all of the tools at its disposal
to collect and analyze data and hear from experts on the benefits and costs of
different choices. While the discussion below identifies many of the relevant
considerations, only Congress should make the ultimate selection of a coverage
formula. Political considerations also call upon Congress to make this decision.
This decision should involve an opportunity for discussion, in a democratically
accountable forum, of the problem of police misconduct and the path to reform.
Here again the VRA is instructive. Adoption of that law's coverage formula
came only after a sustained period of debate with an opportunity to hear and
consider all of the implications of a mechanism that subjected some jurisdictions
to federal requirements.
Before detailing the process of developing a suitable coverage formula, it
is useful to identify some challenges at the outset. The federal government faces
three significant challenges that differentiate police misconduct from voter
registration.
First, a simple metric cannot capture all types of police wrongdoing. Police
misconduct runs the gamut from minor intrusions, like unjustified Terry stops,
to more tragic interactions, like wrongful uses of deadly force. Congress based
the VRA formula upon a simple measure: the presence of a test or device and
voting rates below 50 percent of the eligible population in the preceding
Presidential election. Given the complexities of police misconduct, there is no
comparable single statistical measure that can serve as the basis for a reliable
coverage formula.210 Development of a suitable metric will thus likely be more
difficult. One concern looms large: in the context of policing, a particular
outcome, even death at the hands of the police, is not itself conclusive evidence
a constitutional violation occurred. (After all, police officers are permitted to use
force, even deadly force, in some circumstances.)
At the same time, it is important not to overstate the ease by which Congress
adopted the VRA or the differences between voting and policing. As the
preceding section demonstrates, there was considerable debate in Congress about
the VRA's formula when it was proposed-and little sense that perfection had
been achieved.
Outcome-based indicators can be unreliable for voting rights, as they could
be for police misconduct. That an individual was not registered to vote or did not
vote might reflect racial discrimination on the part of election administrators210. This is similar to the VRA because at the time of the VRA discriminatory voting practices
took many forms and Congress did not pretend that it could track the incidence of various tactics but
instead relied upon low registration rates and low voting rates as proxy measures of discrimination.
Supra Part I.D.
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or result from a personal choice not to participate in elections. Congress's use of
voter participation figures in the VRA should therefore be understood as a proxy
for a problem-unlawful conduct-rather than a perfect measure of it. The VRA
suggests that the task, then, is identifying a similar proxy-recognized as suchfor the problem of police misconduct.
It is not necessarily a problem that a police coverage formula would be
more complex than the VRA formula. A complex formula might be more
difficult to develop, but the end result might well be greater accuracy. In other
words, a more complex formula might be an improvement on the more simple
approach of the VRA. Finally, computer technology and statistical methods
available today far outpace those that were available in the early 1960s, such that
complexities present far less of a challenge today than they did when Congress
enacted the VRA.
A second challenge is that frontline policing is complicated and dangerous.
It requires officers to engage in unstructured, highly discretionary interactions
with the public. Indeed, much policing work takes the form of "frontline
counseling," that is, calming altercations and addressing public nuisances.2 11
Officers also face unique risks and must make split-second decisions. The
discretionary nature of policing thus creates opportunities for wrongdoing and
makes monitoring difficult. In many cases, the only witnesses to an incident are
the police officer and the victim. The potential impact of police misconduct is
also very high: it is moreserious to be the subject of a bullet wrongly fired than
a ballot wrongly denied.
A third challenge is the lack of comprehensive police data. Neither the
federal government nor any other entity currently keeps national statistics on
police misconduct.2 12 In part, the lack of comprehensive data reflect the fact that
policing is decentralized. 2 13 The 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the United

211.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENF'T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note

24, at 91

(stating

that "[p]olicemen deal with people when they are both most threatening and most vulnerable, when they
are angry, when they are frightened, when they are desperate, when they are drunk, when they are
violent, and when they are ashamed").
212. See, e.g., Rob Barry & Coulter Jones, HundredsofPoliceKillingsAre Uncountedin Federal
Stats, WALL STREET J., Dec. 3, 2014, at Al (describing data deficiencies in police killing data).
213.
As is voting. In general, police departments rely on top-down command structures with a
police commissioner or chief (or chiefs) at the top that are responsible for setting internal policies and
procedures. See Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017); see also Peter K. Manning, A Dialectic of Organisationaland Occupational
Culture, in POLICE OCCUPATIONAL CULTURE: NEW DEBATES AND DIRECTIONS 49, 70 (Megan O'Neill

et al. eds., 2007) (explaining that the top command in a police department is typically "composed of
officers above the rank of superintendent (or commander) including chief and deputy chief or assistant
chief'). Police chiefs that oversee city police departments often serve at the pleasure of city officials.
City officials can often remove a police chief from his or her position at will. See 62 C.J.S. Municipal
Corporations § 596. By contrast, communities typically elect sheriffs. See 80 C.J.S. Sheriffs and
Constables § 3.
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States operate with a large degree of independence. 2 14 While the federal
government keeps detailed records on crime rates and officers killed in the line
of duty, there are no national databases on police misconduct.
Again, though, the history of the VRA is instructive in providing a
framework to compile necessary data. The implementation of the VRA formula
required compiling and updating statistics on voter registration and participation
down to the local level in order to determine which states and localities fell
within the coverage formula. When developing a coverage formula, the federal
government will require national data on police misconduct. Generating such
data is feasible, particularly given the sophisticated tools available today for
collecting and analyzing information. Below we set out some practical ways for
going about the task.
One solution to the lack of data is to seek information from local police
departments themselves, with mechanisms to ensure accurate reporting. The
Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress ample authority to compel states and
localities to collect and turn over data as a means for identifying and curbing
police misconduct.2 15 The federal government already relies upon self-reporting
to collect certain information from police departments. 2 16
For example, three of the major datasets on local police departments-the
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), the National Incident Based Reporting System
(NIBRS), and the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics
(LEMAS)-depend upon local police departments to report crime rates,217
incidents surrounding criminal acts, 218 and administrative policies. 2 19 However,

214.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES,

2008, at 2 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z93-DD74]
(estimating the number of state and local law enforcement agencies at approximately 17,985).
215. See generally Robert A. Mikos, Can the StatesKeep Secretsfrom the FederalGovernment?,
161 U. PA. L. REv. 103, 170-71 (2012) (explaining why information demands under Congress's
Reconstruction powers are exempt from the anti-commandeering doctrine that otherwise prevents the
federal government from compelling information from the states).
216. The FBI collects information on crimes reported in most jurisdictions in the United States
through the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). These annual statistics report the number and rate of
different crimes in each reporting jurisdiction. UCR is self-reported and voluntary. See FED. BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications

[https://perma.ccl5C8S-WXFY] [hereinafter UCR REPORTS]. Crime data is also aggregated in the
National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS). See Lynn A. Addington, Studying the Crime
Problem with NZBRS Data: CurrentUses and Future Trends, in HANDBOOK ON CRIME AND DEVIANCE
23-42 (Marvin D. Krohn et al. eds., 2009). Further, the federal government collects information on
police department written policies, internal operations, and community policing initiatives through the
Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS). See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE
STATISTICS (LEMAS): 2007 SAMPLE SURVEYS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2007),

http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/31161
[hereinafter LEMAS].
217. See generally UCR REPORTS, supranote 216.
218. See generally Addington, supra note 216.
219. See generally LEMAS, supranote 216.

[https://perma.cc/2GJS-ZXDE]
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self-reporting has predictably led to problems. 220 Social scientists and reporters
have documented police departments altering or manipulating data reported to
the federal government.2 21 If the federal government simply asks police
departments to report on their own misconduct-with the promise of federal
intervention if the reported figure is high-the risk of underreporting will be
high. Nonetheless, in assessing where misconduct exists, it is virtually
impossible for the federal government to bypass data collection at the local level
because that is where the relevant information is generated. Accordingly, the
government must implement self-reporting in a way that minimizes risks of
cheating.
The subparts that follow thus identify five statistics that Congress can
acquire from local police departments using methods that ensure a high degree
of accuracy. They also explain how Congress can use these statistics to identify
systemic misconduct that can serve as the basis for generating a coverage
formula of the sort adopted in the VRA. Congress has already taken action to
generate some of the proposed data, but in other cases, new legislation will be
needed.
While different data collection methods are conceivable, these five
proposed measures go a long way in identifying whether police misconduct that
merits a federal response exists. 222
1.

Police Use ofForce and CivilianDeaths

One statistical measure that Congress could usefully incorporate into a
coverage formula is the frequency of (a) police use of force and (b) civilian
deaths at the hands of law enforcement. The public has long called for the federal
government to collect this data because of its significance to democratic control

See Barry & Jones, supra note 212 (describing discrepancies between self-reported numbers
220.
on justifiable homicides numbers obtained by the Wall Street Journal and FBI's count).
221. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, As Crime Falls, PressureRises to Alter Data,N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
3, 1998, at Al6 (describing pressures on local police to alter self-reported crime statistics); Michael
Matza et al., US. Review Set for PhiladelphiaCrime Reports, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 14, 1998, at B01
(describing investigations into underreporting of crime statistics by the Philadelphia Police Department);
Steve Thompson & Tanya Eiserer, Experts: Dallas Undercount ofAssaults Builds "ArtificialImage,"
2009),
15,
(Dec.
NEWS
MORNING
DALL.
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2009/12/15/20091214-Experts-Dallas-undercount-of-assaults6330 [https://permacc/37T8-43DG] (describing the Dallas Police Department's underreporting of
assault statistics); Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape Statistics:America's HiddenRape Crisis,
99 IOWA L. REv. 1197 (2014) (describing how police departments systemically underreport or
manipulate rape statistics).
It is worth mentioning that we envision these five forms of data as helpful to Congress in
222.
establishing an initial coverage. This sort of a coverage formula need only last for a limited period of
time. We also envision Congress enacting a formula that regularly incorporates updated statistical
measures as they become available. As in the voting rights context, we would expect that over time,
second generation compliance issues may emerge. In such a situation, we imagine that Congress could
recalculate the weight and inclusion of various metrics. We further envision Congress establishing a
bailout procedure for police departments, similar to the VRA.
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over law enforcement. 22 3 Such calls have grown louder after the recent deaths of
Michael Brown, 224 Eric Garner, 225 and Tamir Rice, 226 and the calls cross political
lines. 227

The frequency of officer use of force and civilian deaths at the hands of law
enforcement is a valuable proxy for systemic misconduct in a police department.
An unusually large number of uses of force by a police department may be
consistent with a department that is using force too often and in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. This could suggest that a department has failed to train
adequately its officers on the constitutionally justifiable circumstances under
which they may utilize force against a criminal suspect. Such a pattern may also
be demonstrative of a lack of adequate internal accountability. Use of excessive
force or deadly force is the most common justifications for the DOJ to bring a
§ 14141 claims against a department. 2 28 Of the sixty-eight investigations the DOJ
has initiated since 1994, forty-eight involved claims of excessive force. 229
The recent federal investigation of Ferguson, Missouri, serves as an
example. There, the DOJ found that the "FPD engages in a pattern of excessive
force in violation of the Fourth Amendment." 230 The DOJ reported that Ferguson
officers are "quick to escalate encounters with subjects they perceive to be

223.

See One Thing the US. Government Doesn't Count: How Often Police Kill Civilians, L.A.
16, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-police-statistics-20141217story.html [https://perma.cc/6BV9-Q97R] (calling for a comprehensive national database on police
killings).
224. See, e.g., Wesley Lowery, How Many Police Shootings a Year? No One Knows, WASH.
POST (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/08/how-manypolice-shootings-a-year-no-one-knows [http://perma.cc/MKY4-DQU9] (citing Michael Brown's death
as inspiring a national conversation on the lack of nationwide data on police killings).
225. See, e.g., Martin Kaste, System for ReportingPolice Killings Unreliable,Study Finds, NPR
(Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/06/391269342/system-for-reporting-police-kiUingsunreliable-study-finds [http://perma.cc/r2ED-DYFS] (discussing how the deaths ofMichael Brown and
Eric Garner inspired national calls for more accurate data on police conduct).
226.
See, e.g., Allen G. Breed, Police Killing Data Filled with Many Unknowns, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/07/police-killings-n_6284358.html
[https://perna.cc/BU5T-QEXP] (describing calls for national data after the multiple deaths involving
African Americans).
227. See Blake Fleetwood, Congress FinallyActs to PreventPolice Killings, but Will It Make a
Difference?, WASH. MONTHLY (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/tenmilessquare/2014/12/congress finallyacts to-preve053348.php
[http://perma.cc/E9AQ-EBAS]
(describing "rare bipartisan vote" for data collection on people killed in police custody).
228. Fixing the Force, PBS FRONTLINE, http://apps.frontline.org/fixingtheforce/#allegations
TIMEs (Dec.

[https://perma.cc/QW5C-5LE5];see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE ALBUQUERQUE

POLICE DEP'T 1 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/apd findings_4-10-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R67E-XCZS] [hereinafter ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS LETrER]
(finding that the Albuquerque Police Department "engages in a pattern or practice of use of excessive
force, including deadly force").
229.
Fixing the Force, supra note 228.
230.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 28

(2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson
police.department report.pdf [http://perma.cc/24E3-7286] [hereinafter FERGUSON INVESTIGATIVE
REPORT].
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231
The DOJ found that officers
disobeying their orders or resisting arrest."
deployed "canines to bite individuals when the articulated facts do not justify
this significant use of force" 232 and turned to force in cases where a suspect's
behavior is "annoying or distasteful but does not pose a threat." 233 Additionally,
the DOJ found that Ferguson officers over-relied on force when dealing with
"vulnerable populations, such as people with mental health conditions or
intellectual disabilities and juvenile students." 234 These findings are similar to
235
Not
those in other cases where the DOJ has identified misconduct.
surprisingly, a pattern of excessive force often accompanies an unusually large
236
number of civilian deaths at the hands of law enforcement.
Congress has recently taken a significant step towards generating data on
officer use of force and civilian deaths. The Death in Custody Reporting Act
(DCRA) requires police departments to report the death of any person "who is
237
along with the
detained, under arrest, or is in the process of being arrested"
238
DCRA ties
The
death.
the
of
circumstances
and
date, time, location,
funding-a
of
federal
receipt
compliance with reporting requirements to the
239
DCRA-generated
powerful means to ensure timely and accurate reporting.
data have multiple benefits. Police departments cannot easily underreport the
required information. A death in police custody generates significant attention
0
and Congress could discover a failure to report. 24 Additionally, compared to

231. Id.
232. Id. at 31.
233. Id. at 33.
234. Id at 35.
235. See, e.g., Fixing the Force, supra note 228 (identifying forty-eight cases where the DOJ
found a pattern of excessive uses of force).
For example, the DOJ investigation of the Albuquerque Police Department found the agency
236.
involved in twenty deaths over a four-year period, the majority of which- were unconstitutional.
ALBUQUERQUE INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS LETTER, supra note 228, at 2-3.

237. Death in Custody Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 113-242, § 13727(a) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §
13727 (2012)). The DCRA is a reauthorization of a 2000 law that expired in 2006. Under that
predecessor statute police departments were sluggish in reporting data and the DOJ did not release any
comprehensive statistics. Allie Gross & Bryan Schatz, Congress Is Finally Going to Make Local Law
Enforcement Report How Many People They Kill, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 17, 2014),
http://www.mothejones.com/politics/2014/12/death-custody-reporting-act-police-shootings-fergusongarner [https://penna.cc/E948-RDU5].
238. 42 U.S.C. § 13727(b) (2012).
12, 2014),
239.
Eli Hager, The Ferguson Bill, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec.
[http://perma.cc/ZDY7-UX99]
https://www.themarshallprojectorg/2014/12/12/the-ferguson-bill
(explaining that states could lose up to 10 percent of federal funding if they fail to comply).
240. Indeed, observers can already largely determine the frequency of police killings based solely
on media reports. See, e.g., Reuben Fischer-Baum & Al Johri, Another (Much Higher) Count of
Homicides by Police, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 25, 2014), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/anothermuch-higher-count-of-police-homicides [http://perma.cc/5NQQ-XHZU] (describing privately-created
databases on social media of police killings). For an example of such efforts, see Kyle Wagner, We're
Compiling Every Police-Involved Shooting in America. Help Us., DEADSPIN (Aug. 20, 2014),
http://regressing.deadspin.com/were-compiling-every-police-involved-shooting-in-americ1624180387 [http://perma.cc/RM7R-MQ4M] (requesting the public's help in complying police killing
data from 2011 to 2013 through news reports).
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other reporting requirements, reporting on deaths is not expensive or burdensome
to police departments as most departments "already maintain 'use of force'
reports." 241
Beyond the DCRA data, the FBI has announced it will collect and publish
data on deadly police incidents involving physical force, Tasers, blunt weapons,
and firearms. 242 The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), an agency within the
Department of Justice, has also begun using open-source data and news reports
to independently create a comprehensive database of police killings.

24 3

Once

launched, these databases can both serve as a check on figures reported by police
departments under the DCRA and furnish a broader count of civilian deaths
caused by the police beyond those that occur in police custody. In addition, the
DOJ has recently announced an ambitious plan to track a wider range of officer
uses of force across American police departments. 244
Civilian death rates are not a perfect measure of problematic police
departments. After all, an officer's decision to use deadly force may be justified.
In addition, officers in particularly dangerous jurisdictions might justifiably use
deadly force more frequently than officers in safer areas. 245 Accordingly, it
would be unfair to determine misconduct exists solely on the basis of raw civilian
death counts. Nonetheless, an appropriately weighted measure of civilian deaths
can serve as a powerful component of an overall coverage formula. 246

Obtaining useful data on officer use of force that does not result in death is
more challenging but not impossible. Unlike civilian deaths, which receive
significant media attention and can be authenticated through third-parties, less
serious uses of force by law enforcement-shoves, punches, kicks, injurious
restraints and such-may remain undetected. Thus, there is a significant risk of
underreporting.
241. See One Thing the US. Government Doesn't Count, supra note 223 (explaining that the FBI
annually collects data from 18,000 agencies for 'Crime in the United States' reports but not 'use of force'
data, which is already maintained in most police departments for their own analyses and personal
reviews).
242. Tom McCarthy, Jon Swaine & Oliver Laughland, FBI to Launch New System to Count
People Killed by Police Officers, GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/dec/09/fbi-launch-new-system-count-people-killed-police-officers-the-counted
[http://perma.cc/H8GK-AK2P].
243.
Tom McCarthy, US Government DatabaseHopes to Tell 'Whole Story' ofPolice Killings
After Year of Guardian Count, GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/dec/13/justice-department-database-police-kiUings-counted-statistics
[https://perma.cc/T5Z8-HTGP].
244. Lichtblau, supra note 110.
245. In 2012, 8 percent of officers in metropolitan counties were victims of assault in the line of
duty compared to 4.9 percent of officers in nonmetropolitan counties. See UCR REPORTS, supra note
216 (navigate to the Law Enforcement Officers Killed or Assaulted [LEOKA] database, then click on
"Officers Assaulted"; on the right-hand side, click on "Table 66" under "Data tables," which shows
frequencies of assaults in different sized metropolitan areas).
246. One way to accomplish this would be to weigh the frequency of police killings against the
relative dangerousness of each jurisdiction as measured by the jurisdiction's homicide rates or the rate
at which officers suffer injuries in the line of duty.
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One approach to address this problem is a requirement for more detailed
incident reports. Such reports would require officers to document altercations
and would be subject to review by supervisors and external auditing. Another
approach is the institution of a mechanism to collect statements from those
involved in police interactions or to receive citizen complaints. Cameras and
other technology can also collect information, particularly if combined with
auditing measures (e.g., to assess whether written reports match what the camera
captures or to identify instances in which cameras appear to have been turned
off). Strong penalties for underreporting-loss of funding, for example-could
enhance the success of these and other possible strategies.
Overall, data on police use of force and civilian deaths can serve as one part
of a coverage formula that seeks to identify police departments with systemic
issues of police misconduct.
2.

Frequency of Civil Rights Suits and Payouts

A second useful statistic is the number of § 1983 civil rights suits filed by
private parties alleging unconstitutional officer misconduct and the amount paid
from these suits. These statistics provide a useful proxy for the presence of
misconduct because claims are bound to results in civil suits. To be sure, there
are significant hurdles to filing and succeeding in § 1983 claims, but data about
such claims provide information that allows for comparison of police
departments around the country. Even if only a small percentage of victims
overall file claims, and even if only a small number of claims succeed,
identifying which departments are subject to or held liable under § 1983 claims
is valuable.
Victims of police misconduct have two options for filing a § 1983 claim.
Victims can sue the officers directly. Although in many such cases the qualified
immunity doctrine will bar a successful claim, 247 some plaintiffs overcome the
doctrine by way of a declaratory judgment or settlement. Further, even claims
dismissed on qualified immunity grounds, or claims that result in a judgment of
no liability, can provide useful information. A high number of claims filed per
capita relative to comparable communities will suggest a problem with police
misconduct in those communities. As an alternative to suing the officer, victims
of police misconduct can sue the department for failure to adequately train or
supervise its officers. 248 Again, some such claims will succeed, meaning the
plaintiff will obtain a judgment or a settlement. While success is a useful
indicator of what is happening within a particular department, even the number
and nature of failed claims is a useful metric when compared to trends in other
police departments.

247.
248.

See supra text accompanying note 65-66.
See supra text accompanying note 68.
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As with any of the measures proposed in this Article, civil suits are not a
perfect indicator of police misconduct. One caution is that lawsuits generally
result from greater levels of misconduct. Thus, many lower-level abuses will not
be captured. Another problem is that not everybody sues. Victims may not know
their rights, lack the resources to bring a suit or hire a lawyer, or face other
obstacles that keep them from going to court. 249 At the same time, some
individuals will be litigious and their lawsuits may not reflect anything
resembling problematic police conduct. But modem methods of data analysis
can control for these kinds of issues. Even without such controls, deviations from
the experiences of peer departments can signal the existence of a problem in how
the police are doing business.
Reliable data on § 1983 claims are easy to generate. Federal court filings
are rigorously tracked. The BJS already reports on every lawsuit filed in federal
court (by the statutory provision that is the basis of the claim) and its disposition.
It would not be difficult to tweak existing collection efforts to specifically
identify § 1983 claims brought on the basis of police misconduct and the named
defendant. 25 0

In addition to relying upon the BJS, municipalities can also provide
information about § 1983 claims. Whether a claim is filed against an individual
officer or against a department, the municipality defends the lawsuit and pays
out any judgment or settlement. 251 Municipalities therefore necessarily have
detailed records on § 1983 lawsuits involving allegations of police misconduct.
Most significantly, municipalities have records of the amounts paid out in
settlement of individual cases-figures that might otherwise be difficult to
obtain. Congress can readily get hold of this sort of information.
For example, Congress can require the clerk of the federal court to transmit
settlement information in § 1983 cases to the DOJ or can tie federal funding to
police departments to transmitting this information. Congress can also likely just
direct municipalities to turn over the data with mechanisms such as loss of
federal funding and random audits to ensure accurate reporting.25 2 Some risks,
of course, ensue. Municipalities may have an incentive to avoid or slow down
settlements in cases of police misconduct. In practice, however, the impact may
well be small given all of the preexisting reasons for such cases to settle
promptly. Some additional measures may also be required to protect the privacy
of the parties and to preserve the confidentiality provisions inherent in
settlements.
The power of civil rights claims data should not be underestimated. In the
handful of cases where this sort of data has been obtained, it has revealed

249. Such factors could include fear of retaliation, the victim's immigration status, or a victim's
own criminal activities coming to light.
250. Indeed, analysis of data already collected by the Bureau might yield this information.
251. See supra text accompanying note 67.
252. See supra note 215 and accompanying text
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startling patterns of civil rights abuses. The Chicago Police Department (CPD)
is a case in point. Over the last decade, the City of Chicago has paid out a jawdropping $500 million in civil rights settlements, judgments, and legal fees all
related to police misconduct. 253 In 2013 alone, the city paid $84.6 million-more
than triple the amount that the city had anticipated in its budgetary projections. 254
Bearing out the significance of these figures, the DOJ announced a § 14141
investigation of the CPD soon after the release of a video showing the shooting
of Laquan McDonald. 255 Put differently, there is good reason to think that if a
municipality keeps civil rights claims information secret, it is because the
information is damning. Mere refusal to make such information available itself
could serve as a presumption of widespread misconduct.
In sum, data on the frequency and payout per capita from § 1983 suits can
serve as a valuable metric for identifying the most problematic local police
agencies.
3.

Arrest, Stop, and Search Data

Congress could also make use of arrest, stop, and search data as part of a
coverage formula. Many police departments already voluntarily report arrest
data to the federal government. 256 Typically, the data show the number of arrests
made each year; 257 in many cases statistics are broken down into offense
categories searchable by suspect age, gender, and race. 258 Generating arrest, stop,
and search information from all police departments (which conditioning federal
funding on collection and production of data will achieve) could be especially
useful in identifying misconduct. Of course, analysis of the data would need to
include controls for such factors as the age, gender, and racial makeups of
259
reporting jurisdictions, so as to permit meaningful comparative assessments.
253. Andrew Schroedter, Beyond Burge, BETTER GOV'T ASS'N (Apr. 3, 2014),
http://www.bettergov.org/news/beyond-burge [https://perma.cc/AZQ8-9XTE].
254. Id.
255. See Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Justice Officials to Investigate Chicago Police
Department
After
Laquan
McDonald
Case,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
6,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/us/justice-dept-expected-to-investigate-chicago-police-afterlaquan-mcdonald-case.html [https://perma.cc/5XVK-RU8K].
256. The FBI collects data on arrests by local law enforcement through the UCR. The reports are
voluntary and some agencies fail to report information over the entire course of the year. Nonetheless,
between 1980 and 2012, the FBI obtained complete arrest data for police departments serving 72-86
percent of the national population. See Arrest Data Analysis Tool, BUREAU JUST. STAT.,
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfnty-datool&surl=/arrests/index.cfn
[https://perma.cc/A89Q-CP2E]
(navigate to "Methods" tab to learn more about the methodology for the presently available arrest
statistics).
257. Id. (navigate to "Agency-Level Counts" for number of arrests by jurisdiction; navigate to
"National Estimates" for estimated arrests by all reporting law enforcement agencies).
258. Id. (navigate to "Definitions" tab for variables available for analysis using provided tools).
259.
Some barriers exist, of course, but they are not insurmountable. For example, while arrests
generate records of booking and detention, stops and searches might not create any kind of paper trail.
But some localities already require a record be made of every stop. See, e.g., Stop, Question, and Frisk
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis-and-planning/
POLICE
DEP'T,
Data,
N.Y.
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Collecting this kind of data would allow for identification of racial
disparities in arrests, stops, and searches. Again, Ferguson provides a timely
example. The DOJ determined that "[d]ata collected by the Ferguson Police
Department from 2012 to 2014 shows that African Americans account for
eighty-five percent of vehicle stops, ninety percent of citations, and ninety-three
percent of arrests made by FPD officers" 260 and that (controlling for other
factors) Black drivers were more than twice as likely to be searched during
vehicle stops as White drivers.2 61 These figures strongly suggest unlawful police
conduct.
Apart from racial disparities, data can demonstrate outright illegal stops,
arrests, and searches. Once more, Ferguson is instructive. The DOJ found that
the FPD engaged in a significant number of arrests for things like "[f]ailure to
[c]omply" with an officer's demands ; "[d]isorderly [c]onduct"; "[i]nterference
with [o]fficer[s]"; and "[r]esisting [a]rrest." 262 The DOJ reported that many of
these charges were not a valid basis for arrest as a matter of state or local law. 263
In other instances, while some arrests within the designated categories were
expected, the large number raised a red flag. It suggested that the police
"reflexively resort to arrest immediately upon noncompliance with their orders,
whether lawful or not" and are "quick to overreact to challenges and verbal
slights." 264 After all, individuals need not engage with the police, 265 and if they
do engage, they need not do so respectfully. 266 High numbers of arrests in failureto-comply and related offenses suggest that the police are arresting people who
are not doing anything illegal. 2 67
Data on what happens after a stop, search, or arrest can also shed light on
police conduct. Large numbers of stops without arrests "suggests . . . that police
suspicions are being aroused too easily and the decision to interfere with people's
liberty is being made too lightly." 268 Likewise, unusually low rates of
stop-questiornandfriskreport.shtml
requirement nationwide.
260.

[https://perma.cc/ZR3P-RFSL].

Congress could extend this

FERGUSON INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 230, at 4.

261. Id.
262. Id. at 25.
263. Id. at 28 (describing "stops and arrests that have no basis in law").
264. Id. at 25.
265.
See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (holding that "no seizure occurs when
police ask questions of an individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent
to search his or her luggage-so long as the officers do not convey a message that compliance with their
requests is required").
266. See Ken Armstrong, 'You're Really Being an Asshole, Officer': The Law on Cursing at
Cops, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 26, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/26/you-rereally-being-an-asshole-officer [https://perma.cc/Q7SE-PWBD] (describing how state and federal
courts have protected the right to curse at officers in ways short of "fighting words" or other calls to
violence).
267. See id. (describing "contempt of cop" cases).
268.

CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., POLICING Los ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE

DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD 24 (2009), http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/HarvardLAPD%20Study.pdf [http://perma.cc/GG7A-Q6G8].
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prosecutions of arrested defendants may suggest that officers are engaged in a
pattern of unlawful arrests. Prosecutors, of course, have various reasons (e.g.,
resource constraints, availability of witnesses and other evidence, or a policy of
leniency in certain cases) for declining to proceed to court even if the arrest was
lawful. But it would not be difficult to control for such factors and identify
jurisdictions where the ratio of arrests to prosecutions suggests problematic
police conduct.26 9 Charging decisions might also be revealing. In Ferguson,
charges against arrested individuals were overwhelmingly brought in municipal
court for violations of the municipal code, not state criminal law, leading the
DOJ to conclude that Ferguson officers were mostly motivated to fill city
coffers. 270

In sum, arrest, stop, and search data, while imperfect, could be useful
components of a federal coverage formula for identifying problematic police
agencies.
4.

Officer DisciplinaryRecords

Disciplinary records are also useful for identifying police misconduct.
Access to such records under open records laws varies. Only twelve states make
disciplinary records publicly available in most circumstances. 271 In twenty-three
states and the District of Columbia, disciplinary records are confidential.272 In
fifteen states, records are available to the public only in limited circumstances,
such as where suspension or termination resulted.273
In addition, police union contracts in many cities contain provisions
requiring purges of disciplinary files. 274 Such arrangements thwart even the DOJ.
For example, when the DOJ initiated its investigation of the Cleveland Police
Department for a possible pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct, it

269.
For example, evidence suggests the NYPD has used minor arrests and legally questionable
stop-and-frisks largely as a means of harassing minority citizens, few of whom are actually prosecuted.
See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, ManagerialJustice andMass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REv. 611, 63135, 641-43 (2014).
270.

See FERGUSON INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 230, at 3, 8.

271.
Robert Lewis et al., Is Police Misconduct a Secret in Your State?, WNYC (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://www.wnyc.org/story/police-misconduct-records [https://perma.cc/BZ4L-ACF7] ("In these states,
police disciplinary records are generally available to the public. Many of these states still make records
of unsubstantiated complaints or active investigations confidential.").
272. Id. (listing states where police personnel records are confidential either under a specific state
statute-as in Delaware, California, and New York-or under privacy exemptions or public employee
personnel records exemptions to state open record laws).
273. Id. It is also worth noting that this would likely not constitute commandeering. See infra Part
IV.B.4.
274.
See Police Union Contract Project, CHECK POLICE, http://www.checkthepolice.org
[https://perma.cc/9BX5-YKQL] (scroll down for table comparing union contracts; navigate to "Police
Contracts Database" for a full database of union agreements); see also Stephen Rushin, Police Union
Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (showing that, based on a sample of 178 police union
contracts, a significant number included a requirement that management purge or otherwise not consider
disciplinary records in future employment action).
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found that the department's collective bargaining contract mandated removal of
2 75
disciplinary actions and penalties from departmental databases after two years.
Chicago illustrates the usefulness of disciplinary records. After seven years
of litigation, University of Chicago law professor Craig Futterman won a
protective order requiring Chicago to release a portion of its police disciplinary
records from the period 2001-2008 and 2011-2015.276 The records show that the
CPD determined 95.89 percent of 56,438 citizen complaints were
unsubstantiated and required no action at all. 277 Further, less than 2 percent of
28,567 allegations of misconduct filed against the CPD between March 2011 and
September 2015 resulted in some sort of discipline. 27 8 The most common
punishment in the small number of substantiated complaints was a short
suspension or letter of reprimand.279 Moreover, Black residents filed 61 percent
280
for
of complaints but accounted for only 25 percent of sustained complaints;
281
White residents, the figures were 21 percent and 58 percent respectively.
Finally, residents directed a large number of complaints at a small number of
officers (less than 10 percent of'the CPD), 28 2 suggesting a police department that
283
fails adequately to oversee its officers.
It is likely unrealistic to expect states across the country simply to alter their
open records laws to facilitate the release of information about police discipline.
Even in states that do decide to grant public access to disciplinary records, some
municipalities will continue to reach agreements with local police unions to limit

Rosa Flores & Mallory Simon, Chicago's Next Fight: Trying to PurgePolice Misconduct
275.
Records, CNN (Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/18/us/chicago-police-misconductrecords [https://perma.cc/QKL4-3P2Z].
276. Rob Wildeboer, ComplaintsAgainst ChicagoPolice PublishedAfter 20-Year Saga, WBEZ
CHI. (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.wbez.org/news/complaints-against-chicago-cops-published-after-20year-saga-113715 [https://permacc/6RMG-SJQP].
CITIZENS POLICE DATA PROJECT, http://cpdb.co [https://penna.cc/BHB4-5ZLY] (navigate
277.
to findings; scroll down for data).
278. Id.
Id. (reporting no penalty in 335 of sustained cases; a reprimand in 580 cases; suspension of
279.
less than one week in 797 cases; suspension of more than one week in 254 cases; and termination in 33
cases).
280. Id.
281. Id.
Id. ("Repeat officers-those with 10 or more complaints-make up about 10% of the force
282.
but receive 30% of all complaints. They average 3.7x as many complaints per officer as the rest of the
force.").
283. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) was in a similar position in 1991. While the
vast majority of LAPD officers, against whom an allegation of excessive force or improper tactics was
made from 1986 to 1990, had only one or two allegations of excessive force, some 183 officers had four
or more allegations; 44 had six or more; 16 had eight or more; and one had 16. CHRISTOPHER
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38. Likewise, a small cohort of officers was involved in most of the
department's use of force cases. Id. at x. The Chicago and LAPD cases are consistent with the belief
among many academics that "10 percent of... officers cause 90 percent of the problems." SAMUEL
WALKER ET AL., EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS: RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM POLICE OFFICER 1
(2001), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/188565.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G3K-HX2R].
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access to these records (unless such arrangements are specifically barred under
state law).
Yet Congress can play a useful role by creating minimum national
disclosure requirements. For example, Congress could require at a minimum
disclosure of incident counts and outcomes without identifying the officer or
complainant. That information alone would greatly enhance our ability to
identify problematic police departments and bring them under the coverage
formula.
Overall, by acquiring access to officer disciplinary records, Congress could
craft an effective coverage formula that identifies police departments that have
systemically failed to respond to officer misconduct.
5.

Citizen Complaints

Congress could also sidestep local police departments and obtain data on
police misconduct directly from the public. Again, the VRA provides guidance.
Under Section 6, if the DOJ received at least twenty validated complaints about
a covered jurisdiction infringing upon voting rights, the Attorney General could
assign federal examiners to oversee electoral processes on the ground and
register voters directly.2 84 While under the VRA citizen complaints were not a
component of the coverage formula, complaints of police misconduct could be a
useful mechanism to identify where police misconduct exists. On the other hand,
citizen complaints could, as with the VRA, be relied upon to trigger remedial
measures within covered departments, such as deployment of federal officials to
monitor department activities.
Relatedly, technological leaps make collecting data far easier today than it
was at the time of the VRA. The DOJ could easily create an online national
reporting system for complaints against local and state police departments.
Victims of misconduct would submit a complaint and federal regulators would
use the database to identify agencies with the highest number of complaints per
capita.
A public reporting system would avoid the problem of underreporting by
police departments. It would also capture the entire scope of police misconduct.
Citizens could file complaints about everything from unjustified Terry stops to
perceived racial profiling and excessive use of force. Importantly, the system
design would identify which police departments generate high numbers of
citizen grievances. For this purpose at least, individual reports would not require
resource-intensive verification. While citizens might, of course, submit false
reports-especially if, as is likely desirable, anonymous submissions are
permissible-no single report will make a difference in determining trouble
spots. As with "How's My Driving?" programs, only high numbers of reports
against a department or an officer will matter; feedback algorithms and other
284.

See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 6, 79 Stat. 437.
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devices can ameliorate problems of false reports. 285 In sum, citizen complaints,
while imperfect, could help expand the scope of the coverage formula and make
it more sensitive to a wider range of police misconduct.
Congress could use all five of these methods to design a coverage formula
that would bring police departments with patterns of misconduct under federal
supervision. Like the VRA, once a department is covered, a separate section of
the act would lay out the reforms necessary to release the department from
supervision.
B. Reforms
As with the VRA, covered police jurisdictions would be subject to
measures designed to remedy existing constitutional violations and prevent
future occurrences. The set of reforms the DOJ has already developed in § 14141
cases provides a useful starting point. Typically, § 14141 settlements require
mechanisms to reduce the frequency of officer use of force and improve
investigation of use-of-force cases; 286 provisions requiring departments to
287
additional training for
implement or update their early intervention systems;
288
improved procedures for investigating citizen
frontline officers;
290
complaints; 289 and new mechanisms for external oversight and accountability.
Where implemented in § 14141 cases, these core reforms have led to significant
291
While they
reductions in civil rights violations by law enforcement officers.

/

285. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, "How's My Driving? " For Everyone (and Everything?), 81
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1699, 1763-64 (2006) (suggesting the creation of "How's My Policing?" programs and
explaining their feasibility).
286. See infra Part 1.B.3.
287. See infra Part ll.B.1.
288. See infra Part III.B.3.
289. See infra Part lI.B.2.
290. See infra Part lIU.B.4. External oversight takes two forms. First, many settlements involve
the appointment of an external monitor. See Rushin, FederalEnforcement ofPolice Reform, supra note
49, at 3247 (listing relevant departments). Second, a handful of settlements have implemented an Office
of the Inspector General (or comparable permanent office) to oversee police behavior. See, e.g.,
Krishnadev Calamur & Eyder Peralta, Cleveland, Justice Department Reach Agreement Over Police
2982
4 9
Conduct, NPR (May 26, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/05/26/ 0 70
[https://perma.cc/TG38-UJ3S]
cleveland-justice-department-reach-agreement-over-police-conduct
(explaining how the Cleveland consent decree requires a new inspector general of police and a civilian
head of the internal affairs unit).
291. Several studies report on the effectiveness of § 14141 reforms. The Vera Institute of Justice
concludes that with DOJ intervention in Pittsburgh the department made substantial reforms that
continued to exist after the monitors left. ROBERT C. DAvIS ET AL., CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION
BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING? THE PITTSBURGH CONSENT DECREE 40 (2005),
2
[https://perma.cc/MAH6http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/ 77-530.pdf
468Y]. A study in Los Angeles similarly found that the LAPD made substantial progress with DOJ

intervention. CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., POLICING LOS ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE

DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD (2009), http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/HarvardLAPD%20Study.pdf [https://penna.cc/YC2S-7KJN]. The record is not, however, perfect For example,
in Pittsburgh, there have been scattered claims of lapses after DOJ intervention ended. See Rushin,
StructuralReform Litigation in American Police Departments,supra note 44, at 1410-11.
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are not necessarily the only desirable reforms to impose upon covered police
jurisdictions (mandating body cameras, for example, would be an additional
useful measure), they have a strong likelihood of success.2 92 Indeed, compared
to the VRA remedies-suspension of tests, devices, and pre-clearance
requirements in covered electoral jurisdictions-reforms generated from the
§ 14141 experience are both more precise and supported by a history of success.
1.

Early Intervention Systems

Many police departments suffer from the "bad apple" problem. According
to one study, 2 percent of all officers generate 50 percent of citizen complaints. 293
In remedying this problem in § 14141 cases, the DOJ has relied upon
implementation of early intervention systems. 294 Some police departments have
also adopted these systems on their own initiative. 295 Early intervention systems
reflect that "within any cohort of police officers, a small percentage will have
substantially worse performance records than their peers," triggering a need for
an early and aggressive departmental response. 296 Early intervention systems
thus collect data on officer behavior and flag officers who appear to engage in
suspicious conduct that merits supervisor intervention, investigation, and
possibly discipline. 297
Early intervention systems are highly effective in combatting
misconduct. 298 One study shows, for instance, that intervention triggered by such
systems reduced citizen complaints against officers in Minneapolis and New
Orleans by 67 percent and 62 percent respectively. 299 In Miami-Dade County,
the percentage of officers with zero use-of-force reports increased from 4 percent
to 50 percent following the implementation of the early intervention system.300
By improving the recordkeeping of officer behavior, early intervention systems

292.
Other possibilities, also used in certain § 14141 cases, could include training measures to
reduce bias, enhancement of community policing, and rules about specific police practices such as uses
of dogs and lineup procedures. See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police
Departments, supra note 44, at 1378-87.
293. WALKER ET AL, supra note 283, at 1.
294. See Rushin, StructuralReform Litigation in American Police Departments, supra note 44,
at 1381-82 (identifying jurisdictions where EIS have been imposed).
295. See SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., SUPERVISION AND INTERVENTION WITHIN EARLY
INTERVENTION SYSTEMS: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT CHIEF EXECUTIVES 1-2 (2005),

http://www.policeforun.org/assets/docs/Free OnlineDocuments/Early InterventionSystems/superv
ision%20and%20intervention%20within%2Oearly/20intervention%20systems%202005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PXW6-KMEB] (reporting that EIS systems have been in use for more than 25 years).
296. See id. at 3.
297.

POLICE EXEC. RES. FORUM, CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS OF LOCAL POLICE: LESSONS

LEARNED 16 (2013), http://www.policeforuim.org/assets/docs/CriticalIssuesSeries/civil%20rights%
20investigations%200f/2Olocal%20police%20-%20lessons%201earned%202013.pdf
[https://penra.cc/P23K-X7GN] [hereinafter PERF] (explaining how EIS reduces misconduct).
298. See WALKERET AL., supra note 295, at 7.
299.

Id. at 3.

300.

Id.
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allow a police department to respond more aggressively to potentially
problematic patterns of behavior. These systems may further incentivize officers
to comply with the law and departmental policies. Requiring covered
jurisdictions to adopt an early intervention system would represent a relatively
non-invasive but nonetheless effective reform measure.
2.

Citizen ComplaintManagementReforms

Congress could also require covered police departments to improve
mechanisms for managing citizen complaints. A police department must be able
to receive, investigate, and respond to citizen complaints in a timely and
impartial manner. Besides bringing misconduct to light, an effective citizen
complaint mechanism is essential to maintaining the community's trust and thus
to the effectiveness of police work.
The Rodney King case is instructive. Immediately after the beating of
Rodney King, his brother, Paul, sought to file a complaint with the LAPD.3 01
However, rather than process the complaint, the receiving officer took Paul King
to an interview room, interrogated him about his own possible involvement in
criminal activity 302 and warned him that Rodney King was in "big trouble" for
"put[ting] someone's life in danger, possibly a police officer." 303 So, too, George
Holliday, whose video camera captured the beating, was turned away when he
sought to file a complaint with the LAPD-which led him to release the footage
to the media. 304 The LAPD simply lacked procedures to permit citizens to file
complaints against police officers.
The ability to file a complaint is not in and of itself sufficient. There must
also be some mechanism to ensure an adequate investigation and response-both
because citizens need to know that their complaints are taken seriously and
because, without a response, misconduct can continue. For example, in Los
Angeles, the DOJ, as part of its § 14141 case, required the LAPD to adjudicate
expeditiously civilian complaints and notify the complainant of the resulting
decision.305 The federal consent decree in the case also required the LAPD to
audit a sample of civilian complaints regularly to determine whether the agency
was satisfying the terms of the consent decree. 306 The federal consent decree
even required the LAPD to send undercover informants to police stations around

301. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 9-10.
302. Id. at 10.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 11.
305. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR OF THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, FINAL QUARTERLY REPORT
58 (2009).
Consent Decree at 40, United States v. City of Los Angeles, 2:00-cv-1 1769-GAF-RC (C.D.
306.
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0002-0006.pdf
15,
2001),
Cal.
June
[https://perma.cc/8UBP-ZR9S] (laying out the terms of the use of force stipulations).
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the city to file complaints and surreptitiously monitor their progress.3 07 Through
this reform and oversight progress, the LAPD appeared to make significant
strides in responding to civilian complaints during the time it was under federal
oversight.308
It is important for a police department to respond quickly and appropriately
to civilian complaints in order to maintain community trust. One reason the
Chicago Police Department has lost the confidence of large swaths of the
community is its poor rate of response to citizen complaints. The CPD takes
action on less than 5 percent of all citizen complaints and those by Black Chicago
residents receive even less attention. 309 The problem can also be sticky. Despite
apparent improvement in complaint handling during the period of federal
oversight in Los Angeles, subsequent reporting found that between 2012 and
2014, the Los Angeles Police Department failed to sustain any of the 1,356
complaints received involving allegations of police bias.3 10
In sum, Congress should require covered municipalities to adopt the
complaint management reforms similar to those required by § 14141
settlements.3 11
3.

Use-of-Force Policies

Congress could also require covered police departments to reform their
policies on use of force. Nearly all settlements in § 14141 cases have addressed
use of force. 312 Congress (or the DOJ) could establish clear policies on use of
307.
Id. (stating that "the City shall develop ... a plan for organizing and executing regular,
targeted, and random integrity audit checks, or 'sting' operations ... to identify and investigate ... atrisk behavior, including: unlawful stops, searches, seizures . . . , uses of excessive force,... [and] to
identify officers who discourage the filing ofa complaint or fail to report misconduce').
308.

NICOLE C. BERSHON, OFFICE OF THE L.A. INSPECTOR GEN., COMPLAINT INvESTIGATIONS

AUDIT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010-2011, at 2-3 (2011), http://www.oiglapd.org/Reports/Compl-A FY1011_4-13-1l.pdf [hereinafter OIG COMPLAINT AUDIT 2010-2011] (showing that between 97-100
percent of all complaints audited showed that officers conducted proper interviews, completed each
investigatory step).
309. CITIZENS POLICE DATA PROJECT, supra note 277 (navigate to the "Collaboration" section
describing the detailed description of how the Citizens Police Data Project obtained this data and the
years it covers).
310.
Kate Mather, LAPD Found No Bias in All 1,356 Complaints Filed Against Officers, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-lapd-biased-policing-report20151215-story.html [https://perma.cc/F7DV-74ED].
311.
See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments,supra note 44,
at 1383-84 (describing the content of complaint management reforms required by § 14141 settlements).
It is worth noting that the International Association of Chiefs of Police adopted similar standards on
citizen complaint management in coordination with the Office of Community Oriented Police Services.
See INT'L ASs'N OF CHIEFS OF POuCE, BUILDING TRUST BETWEEN THE POLICE AND THE CITIZENS
THEY SERVE: AN INTERNAL AFFAIRS PROMISING PRACTICES GUIDE FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

20-26 (2008), http://www.iacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/BuildingTnust.pdf [https://perma.cc/75A4-4P9D].
The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies has also recommended similar
requirements. See id. at 22.
312. Rushin, StructuralReform Litigation in American Police Departments, supra note 44, at
1378-79; PERF, supra note 297, at 12.
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force and require their adoption in covered departments, as the DOJ has
demanded in prior § 14141 cases. 313 Additionally, Congress could require police
departments to adopt policies requiring independent supervisors to report to the
scene of any use-of-force incident and separate all individuals involved in uses
of force for purposes of individualized questioning. The DOJ has required a
number of police departments across the country to install such procedures in §
14141 cases in order to prevent police officers from "conspiring together [after
a use-of-force incident] to create a story that exonerates any and all officers of
misconduct." 314
Other stipulations from § 14141 consent decrees could also be instructive
in regulating police use of force. Congress could require a clear chain of
command in all investigations of use of force. 315 Or Congress could require
departments engage in de-escalation training to reduce the frequency with which
officers deploy force. 3 16 Alternatively, Congress could follow the DOJ's
approach in § 14141 cases and require covered police departments themselves to
establish clear use-of-force policies, including training and reporting
requirements and review procedures. 317 Settlements from § 14141 cases provide
significant guidance as to the type of use-of-force reforms that Congress could
impose on covered police departments.
4.

Oversight

Oversight measures are an essential element of reform. In § 14141 cases,
these measures have taken the form of court-appointed monitoring teams 3 18 of
law enforcement experts and attorneys.3 19 While such monitoring teams can be

313. Previous DOJ actions have required just this. PERF, supra note 297, at 12 (identifying use
of force reform as a focus of "almost all of DOJ's civil rights investigations").
SAMUEL WALKER, THE BALTIMORE POLICE UNION CONTRACT XND THE LAW
314.
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS BILL OF RIGHTS: IMPEDIMENTS TO ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (2015),

http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2086432/baltimore-police-union-contractpdf
[https://perma.cc/QPA9-EW5K].
315. See, e.g., United States v. City of Los Angeles., No. 2:00-cv-1 1769-GAF-RC, at 23-27
(C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0002-0006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GU63-ZH2C] (establishing a clear chain of review every time an officer uses force).
316. See PERF,supra note 297, at 6 (describing de-escalation techniques).
317. See, e.g., United States v. Territory of the Virgin Islands, No. 3:08-cv-00158-CVG-RM, at
6 (D.V.I. Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-VI-0001-0003.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WLT8-DUFA] (requiring documentation of all uses of force); Consent Decree at 15,
United States v. Prince George's Cty., No. 8:04-cv-00185-RWT (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2004),
[https://perma.cc/ZG4C-SX7H]
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-MD-0001-0003.pdf
(explaining reporting requirements for use of canines).
Rushin, FederalEnforcement of Police Reform, supra note 49, at 3247 (listing in Appendix
318.
B police departments subject to extemal monitoring); Rushin, StructuralReform Litigation in American
Police Departments, supra note 44, at 1391-96, 1401-04 (describing the monitoring process and its
benefits).
319. Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, supra note 44, at
1390-91 (describing police preference for former police officers and DOJ preference for lawyers as
monitors).
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32
expensive, 320 they offer valuable expertise and impartiality. ' External
monitoring translates procedural requirements into substantive improvements
and ensures organizational compliance. In Los Angeles, for example, the
external monitoring team (part of the § 14141 settlement) assisted departmental
personnel audit citizen complaint records to evaluate compliance with the
consent decree requirements.32 2 Congress might even require covered
jurisdictions to create independent inspector general offices that oversee police
323
departments. At least one recent § 14141 settlement has taken this route.

5.

Body Cameras

Congress could also mandate use of body cameras by police officers in
covered jurisdictions. Emerging evidence suggests body camera use correlates
with substantial reductions in officer misconduct and citizen complaints. For
example, a study of the Orlando Police Department found that officers who used
body cameras had a 53 percent reduction in use-of-force incidents and a 65
percent reduction in civilian complaints. 324 Another study in Rialto, California,
found that body cameras resulted in a 60 percent reduction in use-of-force reports
32 5
and an 88 percent reduction in citizen complaints.
The DOJ has required the use of body cameras in only one § 14141
settlement thus far (Ferguson), likely because until recently such cameras and
data storage devices were prohibitively expensive. 326 However, industry
competition has dramatically driven down costs.327 Making widespread use of
body cameras is thus today entirely feasible. For instance, a federal district court
recently required the NYPD to begin a pilot program using body cameras to

320. Id. at 1388-89 (reporting the annual cost of a monitoring team is $880,000 to $2,200,000).
321. See, e.g., id. at 1401-04 (describing role of monitors in Los Angeles).
322. Id. at 1402.
323. Cory Shaffer, Cleveland Will Create Police Inspector General as Part of Justice
DepartmentReform, CLEVELAND PLAIN-DEALER (May 26, 2015), http://www.cleveland.com/
metro/index.ssf/2015/05/clevelandwill_create-police-i.html [https://perma.cc/7A63-ZKXH].
324. Nick Wang, Study Shows Less Violence, Fewer Complaints When Cops Wear Body
Cameras, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/police-bodycamera-study_561d2eale4b028dd7ea53a56 [https://perma.cc/4FHS-U3YM].
325. David Feige, BrutalReality, SLATE (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news-andpolitics/jurisprudence/2015/04/police._body-camerasscops.commitless violence andsco
mplaints are real.html [https://perma.cc/GKX6-6X28].
326. Eyder Peralta, Ferguson, Justice UnveilDraft ofNegotiated Consent Decree, NPR (Jan. 27,
2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/01/27/464610005/ferguson-justice-unveil-draftof-negotiated-consent-decree [https://perma.cc/N8NJ-S6LQ] ("The agreement also requires body-worn
cameras....").
327.
See id.; Christopher Mims, What Happens When Police Officers Wear Body Cameras,
WALL STREET J. (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-happens-when-police-officerswear-body-cameras-1408320244 [https://perma.cc/R8GA-49H5] (reporting that body cameras now run
$300-$400 and that cloud storage is cheaply available).
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monitor officer behavior as part of resolution of an unlawful stop-and-frisk

case. 328
Some safeguards will be needed-cameras produce privacy concerns, for
instance 32 9 -but mandating their use can significantly help detect and curb
police misconduct and can be a useful component of imposed reform measures.
6.

Additional Considerations

While the preceding sections identify a series of potential reforms in
covered jurisdictions, the final choice will require Congress's careful
consideration. In making that choice, three factors bear emphasis. First, reforms
should match the problem. The VRA reforms were successful because they
responded to the particular problems voters faced when trying to register and
vote. The VRA ensured a ban on current and future attempts at preventing Black
voters from registering in covered jurisdictions. In enacting a VRA-style law to
remedy police misconduct, it is particularly important that the reforms chosen
address both present issues and potential attempts by police departments to get
around initial remedies.
Second, it would be a mistake to imagine that the government's work is
done once it identifies covered jurisdictions and mandates adoption of reforms.
As with the VRA, the success of a federal policing law requires ongoing federal
oversight to ensure that covered jurisdictions actually implement reforms and
that those reforms remain in place on an ongoing basis. Congress should, for
example, require the DOJ to report back on compliance in covered jurisdictions
so that, if needed, Congress can take additional legislative measures to ensure
the success of the law.
Third, Congress should view a federal policing law in dynamic terms and
allow for adaptations to changed circumstances. As with the VRA, the law
should contain a sunset provision so that its extension requires congressional
renewal. Five or ten years down the road, problems of police misconduct might
well look different from how they look today-perhaps less serious because the
original law has succeeded, perhaps more serious because new challenges have
arisen-with the attendant need for a new approach. There should also be
provisions for change that occur at a local level. The VRA's bailout provision
gave covered states and jurisdictions an incentive to end discrimination.
Likewise, a federal policing law should permit covered jurisdictions that have
succeeded in implementing reforms-such that they no longer engage in
unconstitutional conduct-to end federal oversight. On the other hand,
misconduct might emerge in jurisdictions not covered by the original statute.
328. Mims, supra note 327 (describing federal judge's order that NYPD equip officers in certain
districts with body cameras).
329.

See JAY STANLEY, ACLU, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED CAMERAS: WITH RIGHT POLICIES IN

PLACE, A WIN FOR ALL (2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/police-body-mounted-cameras.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N7L5-MPPP] (discussing privacy concerns).
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Periodic revisiting of the legislative scheme will ensure newly bad actors become
subject to reform measures.
TV.
FEDERALISM

Federal power, even when directed at violations of constitutional rights, is
not unlimited. This Part examines the federalism issues raised when a federal
statute seeks to remedy police misconduct. It concludes that whether such a
statute is evaluated by comparison either to the Voting Rights Act as of 1965as we suggest is proper-or in light of Shelby County and other recent cases, the
statute should withstand constitutional review.
A.

The VRA as Precedent

From some vantage points, federalism lay dormant from 1937 (when the
Supreme Court capitulated to the New Deal) until William H. Rehnquist became
330
launched a
Chief Justice in 1986 and cases like United States v. Lopez
33
revolution. 1 Yet even in the intervening period, in which the Court invalidated
just one law as beyond the scope of federal power, 332 federalism certainly
mattered. The VRA itself generated a broad and deep debate on the meaning of
federalism-and provided a framework for understanding the scope of federal
power to protect minority rights, which should guide us today in evaluating
federal remedies for police misconduct.
1.

Congress

Debates over the VRA included significant engagement by members of
Congress regarding the proposed law's constitutionality. Opponents raised a
series of interrelated objections to the bill that invoked federalism, separation of
powers, and states' rights.

514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (invalidating the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,
330.
which criminalized possession of guns within one thousand feet of a school, as beyond Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause).
331. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1233 (5th Cir. 1997) (Smith, J., dissenting)
("Lopez is a landmark, signaling the revival of federalism as a constitutional principle, and it must be
acknowledged as a watershed decision in the history of the Commerce Clause."); United States v.
Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 591 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Lopez]
reflects a sea change... ."); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 7
(2001) ("1 have no doubt that when constitutional historians look back at the Rehnquist Court, they will
say that the greatest changes in constitutional law were with regard to federalism."); Richard A. Epstein,
ConstitutionalFaith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 168 (1996) (calling
Lopez an "about-face"); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARv. L. REv. 4, 130 (2001)
(discussing the "revolution" in federalism doctrine).
332. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 134-35 (1970) (invalidating provision of Voting Rights
Act Amendments of 1970 requiring states to register citizens between the ages of 18 and 21 as voters).
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Opponents contended that the coverage formula was arbitrary 333 and that it
was unfair-and therefore constitutionally improper-to penalize certain states
and localities with the burden of federal oversight but not others. 334 They asserted
that Congress intruded upon the authority of the states to govern elections 3 35 and
that the legislation thus violated the Tenth Amendment. 336 Opponents also
contended that the proposed bill ran afoul of a constitutional mandate requiring
that states be treated equally. 337
On the other hand, opponents urged that individual states should not be
treated as undifferentiated masses; federal remedial law should not reach
localities where constitutional violations did not exist. 338 According to the bill's

.

333.
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 89-162, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.CAN. 2508, 2517 (1965) ("The
dates are purely arbitrary. The percentage used is equally arbitrary. The events are purely arbitrary. The
supposed result from the facts determined is purely arbitrary.") (statement of Sen. Charles J. Bloch); 111
CONG. REc. 8352 (1965) ("[The bill is] an effort to nullify by arbitrary percentages ... provisions of the
Constitution ... [that] clearly fix in the State the power to prescribe the qualifications for voters.")
(statement of Sen. Sam Ervin).
334. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 89-162, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2516 (1965) ("[T]he
United States of America would be divided into two groups-the good and the bad-if you please. The
'good' . . . could go on exercising their rights and freedoms, and enforcing their statutes. The 'bad' . .
could not.") (statement of Sen. Charles J. Bloch).
335. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 9030 (1965) ("Such an attempted curb on the legislative power
of a State is a flagrant violation of our traditions of Government.") (statement of Sen. John J. Sparkman);
111 CONG. REc. 9334 (1965) ("To try to outlaw and abolish completely a literacy test with reference to
voting is ... directly contrary to the Constitution of the United States .... It is a matter far beyond the
purview of the Congress to impose such limitations.") (statement of Sen. John C. Stennis); 111 CONG.
REc. 9489-90 (1965) ("It is punitive, sectional legislation.... All of the so-called triggering provisions
restrict the bill mainly to Southern States, thereby making it regional legislation rather than national,
general legislation which it should be if it is necessary at all.") (statement of Sen. John H. Sparkman).
336. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 15719 (1965) ("[T]he Federal Government has been grabbing
more and more power.... The States have become mere administrative arms of the Federal
bureaucracy.... Soon they will be deprived of their last significant vestige of sovereignty-the right to
lay down qualifications for participation in the governmental process-voter qualifications, even though
the Constitution specifically grants this right to the States.") (statement of Rep. Thomas Abernethy); 111
CONG. REC. 15720 (1965) ("[T]his administration ... would require Virginia to prostrate itselfbefore a
three-judge Federal court in a foreign jurisdiction and establish its innocence of discrimination.")
(statement of Rep. William M. Tuck); 111 CONG. REC. 15720 (1965) ("[The bill] reaches a crest in the
flood of Federal intrusions into matters constitutionally reserved to the States.") (statement of Rep.
William M. Tuck).
337. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REc. 16015 (1965) ("[T]his ill-conceived formula can only have been
arrived at by first determining that literacy tests of certain Southern States should be suspended and then
coming up with a mathematical ratio that would accomplish this.") (statement of Rep. William M. Tuck).
338. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 9489 (1965) ("This bill ... would bypass the normal method of
letting the courts determine where and how discrimination in voting exists.") (statement of Sen. John H.
Sparkman); 111 CONG. REC. 10448 (1965) ("The Supreme Court has held that a State can have a literacy
test.... However, under this bill, the literacy test would be null and void in the States to which the bill
would be applicable.") (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond).
Opposition to the poll tax provision and the use of examiners also invoked arguments about
the judicial branch. See 111 CONG. REc. 11009 (1965) ("They ask that the Senate sit as judge and jury
on this question [of the poll tax] and render a verdict of guilty.... They ask that this Senate set itself
above the Supreme Court of the United States.") (statement of Sen. Lister Hill); 111 CONG. REC. 10854
(1965) ("[T]he Attorney General is given the unlimited discretion to make a judicial determination that
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opponents, legislation that singled out and penalized some states and localities,
including their officials, was a bill of attainder 339 and an ex post facto law. 340
In addition, such legislation was said to violate due process, 34 1 equal
protection, 342 and the rights of citizens not to vote. 343 Opponents argued that
there was insufficient evidence that racial discrimination explained disparities in
voting rates. 344
Opponents also challenged the bill as improperly motivated to appease
vocal protesters, 345 some of whom were said to want the dismantling of the

examiners should be appointed .... It is wrong in principle and in practice for a Government employee
to be given this ... quasi-judicial function.") (statement of Sen. John C. Stennis).
339. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 89-162, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2522 (1965) ("It is not
within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.")
(statement of Sen. Charles J. Bloch); 111 CONG. REC. 8107 (1965) ("[T]he bill as written inflicts
punishment without judicial hearing and is therefore a 'bill of attainder."') (statement of Rep. Joel T.
Broyhill).
340. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 7935 (1965) ("This bill... will completely abolish the
constitutional power and duty of the States to fix the qualifications of voters.... [and] reduce the
sovereign States ... to mere puppets of the Federal Government.") (statement of Rep. Howard W.
Smith).
341. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 7257 (1965) ("[W]hat happens to the American tradition of a man
being innocent until he is proved guilty? Under the provisions of this bill, a governmental body ...
would have to prove that it was not guilty of an act of discrimination.") (statement of Rep. Joseph D.
Waggonner); Ill CONG. REC. 8107 (1965) ("The present bill... denies due process and equal
protection of the law, as guaranteed by the 14th amendment, to a large segment of our people in the
States to which it applied.") (statement of Rep. Joel T. Broyhill).
342. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REc. 7257 (1965) ("[Tlhis bill is a punitive measure aimed at six
14th
Southern States .... This discrimination, this favoritism, cannot be squared with the ...
amendment. Nor can it be squared with section 2 of article 4.") (statement of Rep. Joe D. Waggoner);
111 CoNG. REc. 7257 (1965) ("Any citizen has the right to be treated alike when the franchise privilege
is at question .... We have no duty to lay a slide rule alongside voting statistics.") (statement of Rep.
Joe D. Waggoner Jr.).
343. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 10447-48 (1965) ("[T]his is a free country.... We cannot haul
people to the polls and make them vote.... That would be depriving them of their freedom.") (statement
of Sen. Strom Thurmond); 111 CONG. REC. 15719 (1965) ("This frantic, fanatical drive to artificially
stimulate people to vote may some day result in columns of people being marched to the polls on election
day. One thinks of Russia where upward of 99 percent of the adult population goes to the polling places
every election day.") (statement of Rep. Thomas Abernathy); 111 CONG. REC. 15720 (1965) ("In
Communist countries ... they do not have the right not to vote. Citizens should have the right to vote....
But they should not be intimidated to vote.") (statement of Rep. Thomas Abernathy).
344. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 15719-20 (1965) ("Many factors enter into voting and the failure
to vote. Americans traditionally exercise the right not to vote, to 'go fishing,' to express their
dissatisfaction with the candidates offered. Sometimes they stay at home out of overconfidence in their
candidate's victory.... Voting statistics strongly indicate that considerations other than race enter into
low voter participation in any given election.") (statement of Rep. Thomas Abernathy).
345. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 9335 (1965) ("Out of the public demonstrations has arisen a
demand that Congress act and act now, because we are told that a great need exists . . . . But the existence
of a need or problem ... is not sufficient basis for legislation . . . [T]here must be a [constitutional]
grant of authority.") (statement of Sen. John C. Stenns); 111 CONG. REC. 7934 (1965) ("We have seen
invasion by persons posing as tourists, staging a sit-down strike in the White House itself. ... We have
seen similar invasion of the Capitol of the United States by demonstrators who remained until they were
dragged down the Capitol steps and placed under arrest. We have seen picketing and demonstrations
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government entirely, 346 and as enacted in the heat of circumstances. 347 For these
reasons and others, opponents concluded, the bill violated-indeed, worked as a
suspension of-the Constitution. 34 8
It is not difficult to imagine similar arguments made against a federal law
regulating police departments. Opponents are likely to emphasize that policing
is traditionally the province of states and localities; that federally imposed
requirements would displace local control; that it is unfair to regulate some
police departments and not others; that the law lacked sufficient precision; that
practices addressed do not necessarily reflect misconduct on the part of officers;
and that Congress was responding, in a heavy-handed way, to public pressure
following high-profile incidents such as the shooting in Ferguson. Such
arguments need not be dismissed out of hand merely because they were offered
in similar form at the time the VRA was under consideration. Nonetheless, it is
useful in evaluating these arguments to recognize that they reflect a vision of
federalism that is not new and that did not prevail at the time of an earlier period
of widespread constitutional violations. While useful in reminding us that
Congress has only limited powers, these arguments should not distract from the
fact that Congress has power to remedy conduct that violates the protections
individuals enjoy under the Constitution.

day after day....") (statement of Rep. Howard W. Smith); 111 CONG. REC. 7935 (1965) (describing
Congress as "yielding ... to the menace of the howling mobs") (statement of Rep. Howard W. Smith).
346. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REc. 7934 (1965) ("[M]any Communists, subversives, fellow
travelers, and others of doubtful loyalty to their country, have attached themselves to this movement....
They have adopted the slogan, 'We shall overcome.' I pose the question, 'Whom and what do they aim
to overcome?") (statement of Rep. Howard W. Smith); 111 CONG. REC. 7935 (1965) ("Martin Luther
King ... has publicly announced that he will defy and violate any law of the land that he disagrees with.
This is the language of rebellion and anarchy.") (statement of Rep. Howard W. Smith).
347. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 8107 (1965) ("The President's bill obviously was hurriedly
written under the stress of great emotion. It is fraught with inconsistencies and inequities and therefore
must be thoroughly studied and debated.") (statement of Rep. Joel T. Broyhill); 11l CONG. REc. 9489
(1965) ("[I]s it not just and proper that we consider the very unhealthy way that the pending legislation
was presented to Congress? . .. It capitalized on the medium of television and publicity, which was its
main purpose.") (statement of Sen. John H. Sparkman); 111 CONG. REc. 15718 (1965) ("The voting
issue ... [has] fired up a wave of emotional hysteria ... responsible for the birth of the President's
unwise, unconstitutional and dangerous proposal. ... Similar hysteria has swept the pillars of freedom
from under many free nations of this world. This bill is a clear and complete surrender to mobocracy.")
(statement ofRep. Thomas Abernathy); 111 CONG. REc. 16005 (1965) ("We find a Congress apparently
willing to sweep away all vestiges of State sovereignties and to ignore constitutional restraints in order
to placate the demands of the militant and lawless mobs in the streets who demonstrate for voting
rights.") (statement of Rep. John Williams).
348. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 9340 (1965) ("[W]ould not the effect of the bill be to suspend the
Constitution of the United States and particularly to suspend article I, section 2, which provides that the
States have a right to fix voting qualifications?") (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond); 111 CONG. REC.
suspend the Constitution in the matter of fixing voter
9340 (1965) ("If the Congress should ...
qualifications, would not that set a precedent for the Congress to pass other laws which would suspend
other provisions of the Constitution if an expediency should arise that might appear to demand it?")
(statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond).
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In enacting the VRA, Congress, by a large majority, rejected the
constitutional arguments opponents offered. Supporters argued that the
suspension of tests in covered jurisdictions was perfectly sensible; 349 that
3
s
Congress enjoyed broad authority under the Fifteenth Amendments
3
51
particularly in light of the history of evasive state conduct,
and such power
included authority to displace traditional state regulations of voting; 35 2 and that
the bailout provision adequately protected the states and localities from federal
overreaching. 35 3 Supporters also rejected arguments that the bill represented a
bill of attainder or ex post facto law or otherwise violated rights-protecting
provisions of the Constitution. 354 Although the VRA was a novel form of
legislation, members of Congress concluded it did not violate the Constitution.
2.

At the Court

The Supreme Court rejected the constitutional objections as well when it
heard the first challenge to the VRA in South Carolina v. Katzenbach. Since
1895, South Carolina had required that prospective voters be able to read and
write any provision of the state constitution, with an exemption for certain
categories of property owners. 355 By operation of the VRA, South Carolina

349.
See, e.g., 111 CONG. REc. 8297 (1965) ("[T]he record ... clearly demonstrates that where
a State uses a literacy test and there is a nonwhite population coupled with a low participation in the
election process, the low voter participation is almost always caused by a discriminatory use of a test.")
(statement of Sen. Mike Mansfield); 111 CONG. REC. 15647 (1965) ("Decisions of the Federal courts
and the reports of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission persuasively indicate that many of the States and
political subdivisions to which the formula applies have engaged in widespread violations of the 15th
Amendment over a period of time.") (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler).
350. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REc. 8301 (1965) ("[Tlhe grant of power in section 2 of the 15th
Amendment ... includes not only the power to strike down the strictly illegal but also the power to
eliminate any substantial risk of evasion.") (statement of Sen. Philip Hart).
351. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 8364 (1965) ("Under the existing Federal law, litigation must be
conducted again and again and in county after county. Long and tedious preparation, court delays, and
the possibility of recurrent evasions of even the court orders beset the Department of Justice in every
case.") (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits); 111 CONG. REC. 8467 (1965) ("[The bill] was proposed only
when experience had taught us the inadequacies of prior laws.") (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); 111
CONG. REc. 15644 (1965) ("[B]ecause of legal strategies and cunning subterfuges, very astute lawyers
retained by certain States have rendered abortive . .. decisions of the courts; so that today we must have
recourse to administrative remedies as well as judicial remedies.") (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler).
352. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REc. 8359 (1965) ("[W]hen a State has failed to honor the mandate of
the 15th Amendment, Congress may adopt appropriate means, even if those means reduce the power of
the States insofar as other provisions of the Constitution which preserve powers to them are concerned.")
(statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits).
353. See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 8297 (1965) ("[S]ince the bill contains ... escape clauses ...
there can be no legitimate complaint that the Congress exceeded its authority.") (statement of Sen. Mike
Mansfield); 111 CONG. REC. 8294 (1965) ("The bill provides the method for the States to cleanse
themselves of any taint.") (statement of Sen. Everett Dirksen).
354. As Senator Philip Hart explained, "The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws
applies only to criminal statutes. The criminal provisions of the bill ... do not operate retroactively. ...
Nor do the provisions of the bill . . . constitute an unlawful bill of attainder since they do not involve
punishment." 111 CONG. REc. 9795 (1965).
355. Brief of Plaintiff at 2, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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became a covered jurisdiction and its literacy test was suspended. 356 Invoking
the Court's original jurisdiction, South Carolina made a series of arguments
against the VRA, many of which tracked the opposition to the bill in Congress.
South Carolina argued that the VRA deprived the state of its powers to prescribe
voter qualifications under Article I of the Constitution; 357 violated a
constitutional principle of equal statehood; 358 violated due process by "an
arbitrary and irrebuttable presumption of racial discrimination by South Carolina
and her inhabitants";35 9 interfered with self-government in violation of the
Guarantee Clause of Article IV; 360 and worked as a legislative trial in violation
of the Bill of Attainder Clause of Article I, Section 9 and Article III's
corresponding allocation of powers to the judiciary. 361 The state further argued
that the law exceeded Congress's powers under the Fifteenth Amendment
because the remedial provisions lacked a sufficient relationship to proven racial
discrimination. 362

In upholding the challenged provisions of the VRA, the Supreme Court in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach took a broad view of congressional power. In his
opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren observed at the outset that "[t]he
constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be judged with
reference to the historical experience which it reflects." 363 In that regard,
Congress had "explored with great care the problem of racial discrimination in
voting" and, as evidenced by the decisive vote in favor of the bill, "the verdict
of both chambers was overwhelming." 3 The Court noted two lessons from the
extensive congressional debates and record: that "Congress felt itself confronted
by an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of
our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution" and
that "Congress concluded that the unsuccessful remedies which it had prescribed
in the past would have to be replaced by sterner and more elaborate measures in
order to satisfy the clear commands of the Fifteenth Amendment." 365 The Court
particularly emphasized the failures of piecemeal litigation under prior federal
civil rights laws. 36 6 Context thus mattered. As the Court explained, "exceptional
367
conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate."
Making quick work of South Carolina's arguments that the VRA was an
unconstitutional bill of attainder, violated due process, or otherwise infringed
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Id.
Id. at 6-12.
Id. at 13-15.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 36-37.
Id at 30-33.
383 U.S. at 308.
Id at 308-09.
Id at 309.
Id at 314.
Id. at 334.
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constitutional rights,368 the only serious question the Court saw was whether the
VRA was indeed a proper exercise of Congress's powers. 369 On that issue, the
Court assigned itself a modest role: "[T]he Fifteenth Amendment, the prior
decisions construing its several provisions, and the general doctrines of
constitutional interpretation, all point to one fundamental principle. As against
the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to
effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting."370
Under this standard, the VRA easily survived. The Court explained that the
statute was "clearly a legitimate response" to the problem of voting
discrimination given the ineffectiveness of case-by-case litigation. 371 It was
"permissible" for Congress to "confine[] ... remedies to a small number of
States and political subdivisions which in most instances were familiar to
Congress by name" 372 and "where immediate action seemed necessary." 373
The Court therefore deemed the coverage formula rational: "Tests and
devices are relevant to voting discrimination because of their long history as a
tool for perpetrating the evil; a low voting rate is pertinent for the obvious reason
that widespread disenfranchisement must inevitably affect the number of actual
voters." 374 That voting discrimination might occur via means other than tests and
devices was "irrelevant" in judging whether the chosen formula was rational. 375
Suspension of literacy tests and other devices was a "legitimate" response on the
part of Congress 376 and federal review of new state election procedures was
appropriate given that "Congress had reason to suppose that . .. States might
try ... to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act
itself." 377 Appointment of federal examiners was likewise "clearly ...
appropriate" because local officials might otherwise deploy "procedural tactics"
to circumvent the operation of the law.378 The bailout provision's requirement
that jurisdictions prove they were not discriminating was a "quite bearable"
burden given that "the relevant facts relating to the conduct of voting officials

368. Id at 323-24.
369. Id. at 324.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 328.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 330.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 334.
377. Id. at 335. Justice Black, who otherwise concluded the provisions of the Act were
constitutional, thought the preclearance provision of Section 5 beyond Congress's authority. See id. at
360 (Black, J., concurring & dissenting) ("A federal law which assumes the power to compel the States
to submit in advance any proposed legislation they have for approval by federal agents approaches
dangerously near to wiping the States out as useful and effective units in the government of our
country.").
378. Id. at 336 (majority opinion).

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

324

[Vol. 105:263

are peculiarly within the knowledge of the States and political subdivisions
themselves." 379
The Court also rejected South Carolina's argument that by displacing state
and local election laws Congress had usurped judicial power. "On the contrary,"
the Court explained, with Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, "the Framers
indicated that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the rights
created in [Section] 1" and "has full remedial powers to effectuate the
constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting." 380 Shoring up
the conclusion, the Court invoked McCulloch v. Maryland to refute South
Carolina's claim that "Congress may appropriately do no more than to forbid
violations of the Fifteenth Amendment in general terms-[such] that the task of
fashioning specific remedies or of applying them to particular localities must
necessarily be left entirely to the courts."3 1 Rather, the Court explained,
"Congress is not circumscribed by any such artificial rules under s[ection] 2 of
the Fifteenth Amendment." 382 Nor was there any merit to South Carolina's
argument that Congress needed to treat states equally: "The doctrine of the
equality of States ... applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted
to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently
appeared."

3.

38 3

Lessons for Police Reform

Under the constitutional standards applied to the VRA at the time of its
enactment-by Congress in passing the bill, the President signing it into law,
and the Court in Katzenbach-a federal law of the kind described in the
preceding sections to remedy police misconduct would readily survive
constitutional review. A coverage formula that brings police departments into
federal oversight is a rational response to the failures of prior efforts that have
relied upon piecemeal intervention and a reasonable mechanism to guard against
future violations of rights. Such a formula may not be perfect. It may bring in
some departments that are not engaged in misconduct and leave out others that
are. However, the VRA-era standards make clear that perfection is not required.
The envisaged reforms are also appropriate because they address the specific
forms of police misconduct and they have a track record of success when used
in § 14141 settlements. If Katzenbach's framework holds true-such that
"exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise

379. Id. at 332.
380. Id. at 325-26.
381. Id. at 327.
382. Id. The Court reiterated this approach the next year in upholding Section 4(e) of the VRA as
a proper exercise of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
383 U.S. at 328-29.
383.
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appropriate" 38'-then Congress has ample authority to remedy the pervasive
problem of police misconduct with broad federal intervention.
B. Modern Developments
Katzenbach was not the Supreme Court's last word on Congress's power
to regulate voting; other developments on the federalism front have occurred
since the adoption of the VRA. This Section, which begins with Shelby County,
sets out why a federal police misconduct law is also consistent with federalism
principles of more recent vintage.
1.

Surviving Shelby County

In Shelby County v. Holder,385 the Supreme Court held that the coverage
formula of Section 4 of the VRA, as extended in 2006, was unconstitutional as
beyond the scope of congressional power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment. The coverage formula therefore violated the Tenth Amendment. 386
The core of the problem, according to Chief Justice John Roberts in his opinion
for the Court, was that the formula-based on data from the 1960s and 1970scould not be justified "in light of current conditions." 38 7 It did not reflect
improvements in registration and voting 88 that had occurred largely as a result
of the VRA itself.389 Despite those improvements, Congress had not "eased the
restrictions in [Section] 5 or narrowed the scope of the coverage formula in
[Section] 4(b)" and thus the VRA's cure was no longer "sufficiently related to
the problem that it targets." 390 Thus, Chief Justice Roberts explained, "[i]f
Congress had started from scratch in 2006, it plainly could not have enacted the
present coverage formula" 39 1 because "[i]t would have been irrational for
Congress to distinguish between States .. . based on 40-year-old data, when
today's statistics tell an entirely different story" and equally "irrational to base
coverage on the use of voting tests 40 years ago, when such tests have been
illegal since that time." 392 In reaching the conclusion that by retaining a dated
formula Congress exceeded its enforcement powers under the Fifteenth
Amendment, Chief Justice Roberts invoked the decision three years earlier in
Northwest Austin, in which the Court expressed doubts about the
384. Id. at 334.
385. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
386. Id. at 2630.
387. Id. at 2627.
388. Id. at 2618 ("There is no denying... that the conditions that originally justified these
measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.").
389. Id. at 2626 ("There is no doubt that these improvements are in large part because of the
Voting Rights Act The Act has proved immensely successful at redressing racial discrimination and
integrating the voting process.").
390. Id. at 2622, 2626 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193,
203 (2009)).

391.

Id. at 2630.

392.

Id. at 2630-31.
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constitutionality of Section 5 but avoided that issue by resolving the case on
393
statutory grounds.

In Shelby County, the Court's invalidation of Section 4 of the VRA turned
on the burdens Section 5 imposed upon the covered jurisdictions. Chief Justice
Roberts explained that "this Court has made clear from the beginning that the
Voting Rights Act is far from ordinary. At the risk of repetition, Katzenbach
indicated that the Act was 'uncommon' and 'not otherwise appropriate,' but was
39 4
In other words, the
justified by 'exceptional' and 'unique' conditions."
legitimacy of the coverage formula of Section 4 had to be evaluated with an eye
to the federalism burdens of Section 5.
Chief Justice Roberts identified three key federalism concerns. First, by
treating some states less favorably than others, the VRA implicated the
395
Of particular
constitutional principle of the "equal sovereignty" of the states.
396
a
represented
that
groups
two
into
concern was that the VRA divided states
reflected
North-South divide. While this division was once pertinent, it no longer
present-day conditions. 397 Second, "disparate treatment," under the VRA,
occurred in the particular context of state lawmaking. Covered states needed
398
federal permission before taking legislative action. Third, by targeting election
laws, the VRA struck at a particularly important state lawmaking power, one that
399
lay at the heart of self-government.
In considering these three federalism burdens, Chief Justice Roberts made
note of their now extended timeframe: "this extraordinary legislation was
40 0
Evaluated
[originally] intended to be temporary, set to expire after five years."
not just on its own but in light of these three federalism burdens, the Court found
the coverage formula lacked a sufficient rationale and was unconstitutional.
While Shelby County gives some pause, it should not alter the conclusion
in the preceding Section that a federal law directed at police misconduct is
constitutionally sound. For Chief Justice Roberts made clear that under
appropriate circumstances Congress indeed had the power to suspend state laws,
require preclearance of new state laws, and treat some states less favorably than
other states-but such measures would have to be justified by current
conditions. 401 Thus, the Court in Shelby County did not invalidate Section 5 of

393.
394.
395.
396.

Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 193.
Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334, 335).
Id. at 2618.
Id. at 2628.

397.

Id.

398. Id. at 2624.
399. Id.
400. Id at 2625.
401. See, e.g., id. at 2629 ("Congress-if it is to divide the States-must identify those
jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense in light of current conditions.").
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the VRA (though Justice Clarence Thomas would have done so) 402 nor did the
Court preclude Congress from adopting a new Section 4 formula to justify the
continued imposition of the Section 5 measures. 403 Finally, and critically, Shelby
County did not overrule Katzenbach. Indeed, Shelby County actually endorsed
the ruling in Katzenbach that, as of 1965, the VRA was a proper exercise of
Congress's power even in light of the federalism issues the law implicated.
Shelby County itself thus supports federal regulation to remedy abusive
police practices. Police misconduct today looks much more like the record of
voter discrimination that was before the Court in Katzenbach than was before
the Court in Shelby County. Current conditions might not support a decades-old
voting formula, but current conditions do support a law identifying and reigning
in police departments that violate constitutional rights. The most significant
lesson of Shelby County is that when Congress exercises its power to remedy
constitutional violations, it must adapt as conditions evolve.
The circumstances that justify federal intervention today might not exist
tomorrow. Federalism requires ongoing attention-including on the part of
Congress itself-as to whether a use of national power that regulates state
government finds contemporary justification. Accordingly, if a federal law
remedying police misconduct achieves the same degree of success as did the
VRA, then Shelby County indicates that the law, if left unchanged, will no longer
represent a proper exercise of congressional power. That outcome, however, is
precisely the price for permitting strong federal intervention when, as with the
case of police misconduct, constitutional violations persist.
2.

StandardofReview

Perhaps, it is naive to invoke Shelby County and Katzenbach in support of
a federal law remedying police misconduct. After all, it was easy for the Court
majority in Shelby County to proclaim fidelity to Katzenbach when nobody had
called that case into question and the issue was the constitutionality of a 2006
statute. One particular wrinkle is the question of the standard of review the Court
today would apply to the federal law we have proposed.
Under Boerne v. Flores, a federal statute is a proper exercise of Congress's
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment if there exist "a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end." 404 That test, the Boerne Court explained,
ensures that Congress is indeed "enforcing" the Fourteenth Amendment by
"remedy[ing] or prevent[ing] unconstitutional actions and measures" rather than
seeking to "make a substantive change" to the meaning of the Fourteenth

402. See id. at 2632 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The extensive pattern of discrimination that led
the Court to previously uphold § 5 as enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment no longer exists.") (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
403. Id. at 2631 (majority opinion).
404. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
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Amendment itself.4 05 Under the congruence and proportionality standard, the
Boerne Court (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach) explained, "[t]he
appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil
presented" such that "[s]trong measures appropriate to address one harm may be
an unwarranted response to another, lesser one."4 06 In invalidating the federal
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as failing the congruence and
proportionality test, the Boerne Court contrasted the absence of "[state and local]
laws passed because of religious bigotry" to justify the statute with the record of
voting discrimination that supported the VRA.407
Although cited in Boerne, Katzenbach plainly did not apply a congruence
and proportionality test. Thus, when the Roberts Court took up the challenge to
the VRA, there was an underlying question as to whether Boerne governed. In
Northwest Austin, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the utility district challenging
the VRA contended that Boerne supplied the (tougher) governing standard, while
the federal government, invoking Katzenbach, argued that it was "enough that
the legislation be a rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition." 408
In Northwest Austin, Chief Justice Roberts determined that there was no need to
resolve the dispute because "[t]he Act's preclearance requirements and its
coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions under either test." 409
Thus the impact of Boerne was left undecided.
The reader of Shelby County looking for resolution of the standard of
review question left after Northwest Austin searches in vain. In his opinion in
Shelby County, Chief Justice Roberts did not revisit the issue of the governing
standard. His opinion makes no mention of Boerne's congruence and
proportionality test nor does it specifically endorse the government's view that
Katzenbach's rationality approach governs. Highlighting these silences in her
dissenting opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg reiterated the Katzenbach
standard of review, 410 pointed out that the "Court does not purport to alter settled

.

405. Id. at 519-20.
406. Id. at 530.
407. Id.
408. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193,204 (2009) (internal quotation
omitted).
409. Id.
410. Justice Ginsburg wrote that "Congress' judgment regarding exercise of its power to enforce
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments warrants substantial deference." Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133.
S. Ct. 2612, 2636 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In particular, she explained, "The VRA addresses
the combination of race discrimination and the right to vote, which is 'preservative of all rights.' . .
When confronting the most constitutionally invidious form of discrimination, and the most fundamental
right in our democratic system, Congress' power to act is at its height" Id. (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, "when Congress acts to enforce the right to vote free from racial discrimination, we ask
not whether Congress has chosen the means most wise, but whether Congress has rationally selected
means appropriate to a legitimate end." Id. at 2637. She concluded: "South Carolina v. Katzenbach
supplies the standard of review: 'As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any
rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting."' Id. at 2638
(internal citation omitted).
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precedent establishing that the dispositive question is whether Congress has
employed 'rational means,"' 411 and criticized the majority for failing, in her
judgment, to adhere to that deferential standard. 412 Perhaps the bottom line is that
the Shelby County majority thought the coverage formula failed rational review,
thereby also failing congruence and proportionality, which, as in Northwest
Austin, obviated the need to decide which standard actually governed.
A federal law remedying police misconduct should meet even the higher of
the two standards. The central problem for the government in Boerne was that
Congress was remedying a problem that did not exist. The Court had already
held that a state or local law that incidentally burdened religion was not
unconstitutional. A police misconduct law, by contrast, is directed at
unconstitutional conduct on the part of law enforcement. Put differently, the
Boerne decision was grounded as much in principles of separation of powers as
in federalism concerns. RFRA defied the Court's own judgment about the scope
of constitutional rights: Congress was intruding upon the domain of judicial
power. A law remedying police misconduct would implicate federalism but it
would not arrive at the Supreme Court as a RFRA-style effort to overturn an
earlier Supreme Court decision.4 13
3.

Localism

In one respect, our proposal is on even firmer constitutional footing than
the original VRA was. In the congressional debates that produced the VRA and
in both Katzenbach and Shelby County, the principle of state equality was
invoked. Congress in enacting the VRA and the Katzenbach Court (which
narrowed the understanding of equal state sovereignty to terms of admission to
the Union) rejected the challenge to federal power on this basis. Chief Justice
Roberts' opinion in Shelby County, however, gives particular emphasis to the
principle of equal state sovereignty: the disparate treatment of states, particularly
along a northern-southern axis, was a key aspect of the Court's federalism
concern in evaluating the 2006 law.

A lingering issue is whether, in light of the Court's decision in Boerne, Justice Ginsburg
means to reserve the "any rational means" standard to federal laws that address the combined problem
of racial discrimination and voting. Id. But if there is some magic in two constitutional problems, it is
found also in police misconduct where violations of constitutional rights have a racial (and thus equal
protection) component.
411. Id. at 2638.
412. Id. at 2637-38 ("Until today, in considering the constitutionality of the VRA, the Court has
accorded Congress the full measure of respect its judgments in this domain should garner.").
413. In addition, because the remedies set out above are directed at the appropriate target-4he
police themselves-the proposal avoids the problem that doomed the civil remedy provision of the
Violence Against Women Act in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621-27 (2000) (holding that
under a congruence and proportionality standard Congress's Section 5 power did not support VAWA's
civil remedy because that remedy was directed at private perpetrators of violence rather than state
governments).

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

330

[Vol. 105:263

Our proposal largely avoids the problem of unequal state sovereignty.
Because policing is localized, it is unlikely that our formula will cover an entire
state. All states will likely have some covered localities (and some that are not
covered), and coverage is most unlikely to produce a North-South divide. Indeed,
the formula we urge will likely be more rational (or more congruent and
proportional) than the 1965 VRA was. Even though voting is also localized, 414
the VRA swept in entire states. Our more surgical approach thus avoids a key
federalism concern of Shelby County. When Congress regulates not states but
localities dispersed around the country, objections grounded in federalism-a
state-centered principle-have less punch. Localities, of course, exist as a
function of state government, from which they derive their authority, so
regulating localities ultimately does implicate state governmental interests.
Nonetheless, in our constitutional scheme, states have special footing; the
Constitution makes no mention at all of towns, cities, or counties, and it provides
protections to states that are not available to their subunits.4 15 From a federalism
perspective, a federal law that targets some states but not others should be viewed
with greater skepticism than a federal law that targets some counties within every
state.
4.

Commandeering

The Supreme Court has held that the federal government may not
"commandeer" state legislative or executive officials by compelling them to
carry out a federal program.4 16 A federal law that requires localities (or states) to
take action, such as by enacting a new law (or repealing an old) or implementing
administrative measures, arguably involves unconstitutional commandeering.

414. Article I provides that "[t]he times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 4. In practice, however, elections largely operate at the local level, governed by local rules,
because states have turned over the electoral process to counties and townships. The degree of local
control and the way in which it is exercised varies among states; even within individual states, practices
vary because localities adopt different approaches. Commentators thus refer to the electoral process as
"hyperfederalized" ALEC C. EWALD, THE WAY WE VOTE: THE LOCAL DIMENSION OF AMERICAN

SUFFRAGE 3 (2009).
415. Notably, the Eleventh Amendment protects states but not cities and other subunits of state
government.
416. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) ("Congress cannot circumvent ... [New
York] by conscripting the States' officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.") (invalidating provisions
of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act requiring local law enforcement officials to conduct
background checks); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) ("While Congress has
substantial powers to govern the Nation directly .. .the Constitution has never been understood to confer
upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress' instructions.")
(invalidating provisions of the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act requiring
states to regulate low-level radioactive waste).
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Thus, one objection is that by requiring changes in police practices our proposed
reforms entail unconstitutional federal commandeering.
The commandeering objection, while deserving consideration, is readily
addressed. Congress's power to respond to constitutional violations by the police
derives from its powers to enforce the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment (which incorporates most of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights against the states). Although the Supreme Court itself has not
decided whether the anti-commandeering principle applies to Congress's
Reconstruction powers, it has held that a properly "congruen[t] and
proportional[]" federal statute enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment may force state-level change in order to "remedy or prevent
unconstitutional actions." 41 7 Many scholars take the position that the anticommandeering doctrine does not apply when Congress acts to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments because those amendments give Congress special
authority to regulate the states.4 18 For example, the Family and Medical Leave

417. Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997). A related question, given the degree to
which policing is localized, is whether Congress can compel states to require localities to comply with
federal requirements. In enacting a national law, it might well be easier for Congress to specify broad
requirements but charge states with the detailed implementation that will be needed in light of local
conditions. Can Congress require state-level changes-which themselves will take account of localized
practices-rather than legislate change directly at the local level? The answer is surely yes. Localization
of police is a product of state law. It would be odd to conclude that congressional power to force state
government action disappears once states themselves delegate authority to a locality. In addition, from
a federalism perspective it is surely less intrusive for Congress to give state government the ability to
shape the details of a compliance program at the local level than for Congress itself (or a designated
federal agency) to intervene in a more specific manner at the local level.
418. See Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-CommandeeringCases, 574 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 158, 164-65 (2001) (treating the anti-commandeering principle as limited
to exercise of Article I powers); Matthew D. Adler & Seth Kreimer, The New Etiquette ofFederalism:
New York, Printz and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 123 ("The Court's language in [Penn. Dep't
Correctionsv.] Yeskey [524 U.S. 206 (1998)] implies that the anticommandeering doctrines limit only
legislation adopted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, and are inapplicable to a federal statute
appropriately grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment."); Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and
Subordinacy:May Congress CommandeerState Officers to Implement FederalLaw?, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1001, 1006 n.13 (1995) ("Arguably, congressional commandeering as a means of exercising its
Section Five power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's limitations on state authority . .. does not
raise the same federalism issues [as uses of Article I powers], since the Reconstruction Amendments
were openly designed to curb state sovereignty."); Daniel A. Farber, Pledging A New Allegiance: An
Essay on Sovereignty and the New Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1133, 1140-41 (2000)
("[E]ven the anti-commandeering principle may well bow to Congress's enforcement powers under the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, as does the state's sovereign immunity."); Roderick
M. Hills Jr., The PoliticalEconomy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and
"Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 888-89 (1998) ("The New York Court did not
address the issue of whether New York's anticommandeering rule applied to any exercise of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court has upheld provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that
arguably commandeer the electoral process of state governments."); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and
the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2180, 2210 (1998) ("[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment retains important possibilities as part of the post-Civil War constitutional order
for authorizing federal compulsion of states across a wide array of issues and substantive areas."); Robert
A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secretsfrom the Federal Government?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 171
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Act ("FMLA") allows eligible employees to take unpaid leave in response to a
"serious health condition" on the part of the employee's spouse, child, or parent.
The Act applies to employees of state and local government just as it applies to
private sector employees.4 19 Aggrieved employees may obtain equitable relief
and monetary damages against employers who "interfere with, restrain, or deny
the exercise of' FMLA rights. 420 The constitutional basis for applying the law to
public employees is Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress enacted
the law to promote gender equity in the workplace in light of a long history of
family care duties falling on female employees who then faced adverse
consequences as a result of taking time off.42 1The Act requires state government
to take affirmative steps to provide employees with leave (or else suffer a
financial penalty); the Supreme Court has upheld the statute as a proper exercise
of congressional authority. 422
Indeed, the Voting Rights Act itself-enacted under Section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment-works as a significant commandeering of the states and
an interference with state delegation of authority to localities. The VRA
suspended state and local laws governing voting, required the adoption of new
state government administrative measures, and required states and localities to
obtain federal approval before new voting policies could take effect. The
Supreme Court has never suggested those provisions were unconstitutional
commandeering.4 23
It bears underscoring that the Reconstruction powers permit Congress both
to prevent states from engaging in certain activities and to demand that states

(2012) ("Congress may commandeer the states pursuant to its powers under the Reconstruction Era
Amendments.... The basis for this exception is straightforward: the Reconstruction Amendments
changed Congress's relationship vis-A-vis the states.").
419. 107 Stat. 9, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2012).
420. Id. § 2615(a)(1).
421. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
422. Id. at 734.
423.
In cases involving federal election statutes besides the Voting Rights Act, lower courts have
rejected anti-commandeering arguments on the ground that the anti-commandeering cases involve uses
of the Commerce Clause whereas the Constitution's Elections Clause gives Congress special power to
displace state (and local) election practices and thus its use is not constrained by the same anticommandeering rules. See, e.g., Ass'n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 836
(6th Cir. 1997). Courts have likewise rejected the companion argument that federal law that requires
state governments to act to reform local voting practices interferes with the ability of states to structure
state government, specifically the powers delegated to localities: again, the rationale is that the
Constitution itself gives Congress power to interfere with those delegations through the Elections
Clause. See, e.g., Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2008).
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425
take affirmative steps, 4 24 as various federal civil rights laws require. Thus, in
remedying police misconduct, Congress is in no way limited to directing states
and localities to refrain from some behavior. Instead, acting under the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress can also compel state and local governmental action.
From a commandeering perspective, "the federal government could plausibly
426
That conclusion
demand any enforcement service it wanted from the states."
makes considerable sense: as landmark constitutional cases demonstrate,
remedying constitutional violations very often requires action on the part of the
offender. 427

CONCLUSION: POLITICS

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides a blueprint for remedying police
misconduct. However, the plausibility of such decisive federal action depends

As Professors Adler and Kreimer explain: "One might argue that, since the Constitution
424.
protects only against government action rather than government inaction, the only legislation required
to implement the Fourteenth Amendment will impose negative duties and will thus be a permissible
exercise of the federal preemption power. But such a response fails to account both for the scope of wellsettled constitutional doctrine and for the legitimacy of congressional action under the Fourteenth
Amendment to prevent, as well as to remedy, constitutional violations." Adler & Kreimer, supra note
418, at 124.
425. Id. at 125-26 ("[Much ... legislation-most prominently Title VII and the voting rights
legislation sustained in City of Rome, as well as municipal responsibility for deliberate indifference to
constitutional violations- ... requires the states to take affirmative measures to comply with federal
civil rights mandates.").
426. Mikos, supranote 418, at 171. Beyond the Section 5 argument, the Court's decision inReno
v. Condon provides an additional basis for exempting our proposed reforms from anti-commandeering
constraints. 528 U.S. 141 (2000). Condon upheld the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act, which
restricts the ability of the states to sell or otherwise disclose a driver's personal information without the
driver's consent and imposes civil and criminal penalties for non-compliance. Id. at 145-46. In
challenging the statute, South Carolina contended that it violated New York and Printz because it
required that state employees "learn and apply the Act's substantive restrictions," including its various
exemptions and that "these activities will consume the employees' time and thus the State's resources."
Id. at 150. In his opinion for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist, though acknowledging that
the statute would "require time and effort on the part of state employees," rejected the anticommandeering claim, explaining that the law merely "'regulate[d] state activities,' rather than
'seek[ing] to control or influence the manner in which States regulate private parties."' Id. (quoting
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514 (1988)). States are not somehow exempt from federal law
merely because adherence requires the state to take action: "[any federal regulation demands
compliance," Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, and "[t]hat a State wishing to engage in certain activity
must take administrative and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal standards regulating
that activity is a commonplace that presents no constitutional defect." Id. at 150-51 (quoting Baker, 485
U.S. at 514-15). Thus, a federal law that imposes federal requirements upon existing state activities
(rather than requires the states to get involved in regulating private parties on behalf of the federal
government) presents no commandeering problem. Our proposals, because they limit or alter existing
state and local police laws and practices, would fall within the Condon exemption. See id. at 151.
427. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) ("[S]chool
authorities [in cases of unconstitutional racial segregation] are clearly charged with the affirmative duty
to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch.") (quoting Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S.
430, 437 (1968)) (internal quotations omitted).
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on politics. Today, the divide between our political parties-and political
preferences-often seems much greater than the six hundred miles that separate
Ferguson from Selma. With Congress having failed even to adopt a new voting
rights formula after Shelby County,428 the chances of a federal police misconduct

law may seem slight.
Yet political division is nothing new. The VRA itself ended with bipartisan
support, but it did not begin there. The credit for unifying Congress-and the
nation-after the brutality at the Edmund Pettus Bridge belongs to President
Johnson. When he took the lectern at the televised joint session of Congress on
March 15, 1965, Johnson laid out the stakes:
I speak tonight for the dignity of man and the destiny of democracy. I
urge every member of both parties-Americans of all religions and of
all colors-from every section of this country, to join me in that cause.
At times history and fate meet at a single time in a single place to shape
a turning point in man's unending search for freedom. So it was at
Lexington and Concord. So it was a century ago at Appomattox. So it
was last week in Selma, Alabama. 429
Five decades later, remedying police misconduct may well require a
president who recognizes "So it was in Ferguson, Missouri," and who, like
President Johnson, champions reform.

428. Bills proposing a new coverage formula have been introduced in the Senate and the House
but have failed. See Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014, H.R 3899, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014); Voting
Rights Amendment Act of 2014, S. 1945, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014).
429. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Voting Rights Act Address (Mar. 15, 1965).

